Term
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Definition
| The Constitution may not be limited to the words the framers ratified in 1787-88, 1868, and at other times when the constitution was amended. From the first, Americans have asserted that unwritten constitutional principles limit governing officials. |
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Term
| What are constitutions for? |
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Definition
| The Constitution does more than limit government. Such provisions as the interstate commerce clause empower Congress. The constitutional text expresses national aspirations and establishes processes for making laws that enable persons with very different politics to share the same civic space. |
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Term
| How should constitutions be interpreted? |
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Definition
| How the Constitutions is best interpreted depends on the best answers to the other basic constitutional questions. |
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Term
| How should constitutional disputes be resolved? |
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Definition
| Constitutionalism does not require judicial supremacy, the view that courts resolve all constitutional controversies. The framers thought that our system of government and basic rights would be better maintained by well-designed constitutional institutions than by written declarations of constitutional law enforced in the United States have played important roles settling major constitutional disputes. In some cases, most notably the constitutional disputes over American expansion, courts played almost no role in constitutional debates. |
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Term
| How are constitutions ratified, changed, and repudiated? |
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Definition
| Article V does not explain all or even most constitutional change in the United States. Americans have frequently adopted new constitutional practices without using the textually prescribed proves for constitutional amendment. |
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Term
| What is a rigid constitution? |
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Definition
| Rigid constitutions are defined as such because at least some part of the constitution cannot be modified by the same procedures used to enact statutory law. |
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Term
| Does a constitution require rigidity? |
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Definition
| A rigid constitution requires a special procedure for amendment , which is more complicated than the ordinary law making procedure. It may need (i) special majority for amendment , or (ii) the approval by referendum i.e. the occasion when all the voters of the country can vote on an important issue related to the proposed amendment ,or (iii) approval by a specified number of the status , or (iv) sitting up of a constituent assembly for considering the amendment. Rigid constitution need not be only a written one per se, as is noted evidently from the living and organic constitution India has. Requirement would be based on opinion. |
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Term
| Can or should the Constitution evolve over time? |
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Definition
| The Constitution does evolve over time to handle new political challenges that the framers of the Constitution could not account for. IE Slavery, Woman's Rights, etc |
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Term
| Marbury v. Madison; Does Marbury have a right to the commission? |
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Definition
| Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executive’s constitutional power of appointment has been exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required from the person possessing the power has been performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury became effective when signed by President Adams. |
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Term
| Marbury v. Madison; Does the law grant Marbury a remedy? |
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Definition
| Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy. The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy. The President, by signing the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this legal right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a remedy. |
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Term
| Marbury v. Madison; Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void? |
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Definition
| Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void. It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply. |
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Term
| Marbury v. Madison; Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution? |
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Definition
| No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution. The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form without substance. |
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Term
| Marbury v. Madison; Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus? |
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Definition
| No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus. To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction. It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction. |
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Term
| Martin v. Hunter Lessee; Facts |
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Definition
| VA took Fairfax land during Rev War. Sold it to Hunter. Martin inherited Fairfax's land and sued VA. Ct. of Appeals ruled in favor of Hunter SCOTUS overturned. VA declared Sect 25 of Judiciary Act of 1789 unconstitutional. SCOTUS addresses this Q. |
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Term
| Martin v. Hunter Lessee; Questions of the law |
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Definition
| Is section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 Constitutional? |
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Term
| Martin v. Hunter Lessee; IS section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 Constitutional? |
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Definition
Yes. The U.S. Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions involving federal law.
The federal power was given directly by the people and not by the States. Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution states that “in all other cases before mentioned the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction”. This demonstrates a textual commitment to allow Supreme Court review of state decisions.
If the Supreme Court could not review decisions from the highest State courts, the state courts necessarily would be excluded from hearing cases involving questions of federal law. It had already been established that state courts have the power to rule on issues of federal law, and therefore the Supreme Court must be able to review those decisions. The Court also held that the Supremacy Clause states that the federal interpretation trumps the states’ interpretation.
The Court rejected concerns regarding state judicial sovereignty. The Supreme Court could already review state executive and legislative decisions and this case was no different. Story then confronted the arguments that state judges were bound to uphold the Constitution just as federal judges were, and so denying state interpretations presumed that the state judges would less than faithfully interpret the Constitution. The Court stated that the issue did not concern bias; rather, it concerned the need for uniformity in federal law. The Supreme Court concluded that the decision by the Virginia court of appeals was in error. |
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Term
| McCullogh v. Maryland; Facts |
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Definition
| The Maryland State legislature enacted a tax in which any note of any bank that is not incorporated by the state of Maryland would be subjected to taxes. James McCulloch worked as a cashier for the Bank of the United States branch located in Baltimore, Maryland. The tax would force the Bank of the United States to be taxed and McCulloch was sued because he refused to pay the taxes. |
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Term
| McCullogh v. Maryland; Questions of Law |
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Definition
Does Congress have the power under the Constitution to incorporate a bank, even though that power is not specifically enumerated within the Constitution?
Does the State of Maryland have the power to tax an institution created by Congress pursuant to its powers under the Constitution? |
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Term
McCullogh v. Maryland;
Does the State of Maryland have the power to tax an institution created by Congress pursuant to its powers under the Constitution? |
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Definition
| Yes. Congress has power under the Constitution to incorporate a bank pursuant to the Necessary and Proper clause (Article I, section 8). |
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Term
| McCullogh v. Maryland; Does Congress have the power under the Constitution to incorporate a bank, even though that power is not specifically enumerated within the Constitution? |
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Definition
| No. The State of Maryland does not have the power to tax an institution created by Congress pursuant to its powers under the Constitution. |
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Term
| McCullogh v. Maryland; Rulings |
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Definition
The Government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action, and its laws, when made in pursuance of the Constitution, form the supreme law of the land. There is nothing in the Constitution which excludes incidental or implied powers. If the end be legitimate, and within the scope of the Constitution, all the means which are appropriate and plainly adapted to that end, and which are not prohibited, may be employed to carry it into effect pursuant to the Necessary and Proper clause.
The power of establishing a corporation is not a distinct sovereign power or end of Government, but only the means of carrying into effect other powers which are sovereign. It may be exercised whenever it becomes an appropriate means of exercising any of the powers granted to the federal government under the U.S. Constitution. If a certain means to carry into effect of any of the powers expressly given by the Constitution to the Government of the Union be an appropriate measure, not prohibited by the Constitution, the degree of its necessity is a question of legislative discretion, not of judicial cognizance.
The Bank of the United States has a right to establish its branches within any state. The States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to impede or in any manner control any of the constitutional means employed by the U.S. government to execute its powers under the Constitution. This principle does not extend to property taxes on the property of the Bank of the United States, nor to taxes on the proprietary interest which the citizens of that State may hold in this institution, in common with other property of the same description throughout the State. |
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Term
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Definition
| New York required a license for steamships to operate in its waters, but New York granted Livingston and Fulton exclusive right of steam boat navigation on New York state waters. Ogden was able to persuade New Jersey legislature to grant him a similar privilege, and was assigned the right to navigate waters between New York City and certain ports in New Jersey. Ogden brought forward a law suit, seeking an injunction to restrain his former business partner Gibbons, from operating steam ships upon New York waters in violation of his exclusive privilege. |
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Term
| Gibbons vs. Ogden; Questions of law |
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Definition
May a state enact legislation that regulates a purely internal affair regarding trade or the police power, or is pursuant to a power to regulate interstate commerce concurrent with that of Congress, which confers a privilege inconsistent with federal law?
Do states have the power to regulate those phases of interstate commerce which, because of the need of national uniformity, demand that their regulation, be prescribed by a single authority?
Does a state have the power to grant an exclusive right to the use of state waterways inconsistent with federal law? |
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Term
| Gibbons vs. Ogden; May a state enact legislation that regulates a purely internal affair regarding trade or the police power, or is pursuant to a power to regulate interstate commerce concurrent with that of Congress, which confers a privilege inconsistent with federal law? |
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Definition
| No. A state may not legislation inconsistent with federal law which regulates a purely internal affair regarding trade or the police power, or is pursuant to a power to regulate interstate commerce concurrent with that of Congress. |
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Term
| Gibbons vs. Ogden; Do states have the power to regulate those phases of interstate commerce which, because of the need of national uniformity, demand that their regulation, be prescribed by a single authority? |
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Definition
| No. States do not have the power to regulate those phases of interstate commerce which, because of the need of national uniformity, demand that their regulation, be prescribed by a single authority. |
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Term
| Gibbons vs. Ogden; Does a state have the power to grant an exclusive right to the use of state waterways inconsistent with federal law? |
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Definition
| No. A state does not have the power to grant an exclusive right to the use of state navigable waters inconsistent with federal law. |
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Term
| Gibbons vs. Ogden; Ruling |
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Definition
The laws of New York granting to Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton the exclusive right of navigating state waters with steamboats are in collision with the acts of Congress. The acts of Congress under the Constitution regulating the coasting trade are supreme. State laws must yield to that supremacy, even though enacted in pursuance of powers acknowledged to remain in the States. A license, such as that granted to Gibbons, pursuant to acts of Congress for regulating the coasting trade under the Commerce Clause of Article I confers a permission to carry on that trade.
The power to regulate commerce extends to every type of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign nations and among the States. The commerce power includes the regulation of navigation, including navigation exclusively for the transportation of passengers. It extends to vessels propelled by steam or fire as well as to wind and sails.
The power to regulate commerce is general, and has no limitations other than those prescribed in the Constitution itself. It is exclusively vested in Congress and no part of it can be exercised by a State.
While the commerce power does not stop at the external boundary of a State, it does not extend to commerce which is completely internal. State inspection laws, health laws, and laws for regulating transportation and the internal commerce of a State fall within the state police power and are not within the power granted to Congress. |
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Term
| Cooley v. Board of Wardens; Facts |
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Definition
| In 1789, passed a statute adopting the state laws then in force regarding the use of pilots to assist in interior waters of the United States. In 1803, Pennsylvania would enact a law requiring ships entering or leaving the port of Philadelphia to engage a local pilot to guide them through the harbor and imposed a penalty for noncompliance. The Board of Wardens brought an action against Cooley for violating the Pennsylvania law and Cooley defended himself by stating that the Pennsylvania law was unconstitutional either because it is an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce (commerce clause) or is in conflict with the 1789 federal statute. |
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Term
| Cooley v. Board of Wardens; Questions of law |
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Definition
Does the Commerce Clause deprive the States of all power to regulate interstate commerce such that Congress may not confer such power onto the state through legislation? (No)
In what ways may the states regulate interstate commerce notwithstanding Congress’ exclusive authority to regulate it under the Constitution? (Maybe) |
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Term
| Cooley v. Board of Wardens; Opinion |
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Definition
If the States were divested of the power of legislate on this subject by the grant of the commercial power to Congress, it is plain this act could not confer upon them power thus to legislate. If the Constitution excluded the States from making any law regulating commerce, certainly Congress cannot reverse that to the States, that power. Yes, the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce which includes the regulation of pilots. However, it does not deprive the States of all powers to regulate them. States may regulate matters which, because of their number and diversity, may never be adequately dealt with by Congress under the Commerce Clause. Congress leaves regulations to those of states when it does not have the intent regulate in that area.
The act of 1789 contains a clear and authoritative declaration by the first Congress, that the nature of this subject is such, that until Congress should find it necessary to exert its power, it should be left to the legislation of the States; that it is local and not national; that it is likely to be best provided for, not by one system , or plan of regulations, but by as many as the legislative discretion of the sever States should deem applicable to the local peculiarities of the ports within their limits. States may regulate those aspects of interstate commerce that are so local in character as to require diverse treatment. |
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Term
| Cooley v. Board of Wardens; Dissent |
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Definition
| he inherent power of states is recognized by virtue of Congress; by the subject that it is more appropriate for the State than Federal action; and consequently, it must be presumed the Constitution cannot have intended to inhibit the states actions. McLean agrees that the charge of half-pilotage is correct under the circumstances, but congress, to whom the subject peculiarly belongs, should have been applied to, and no doubt it would have adopted the act of the States. |
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Term
| Cooley v. Board of Wardens; Concurring |
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Definition
| The power of all states commerce is an inherent power and not one that is subjected to the sanction of the federal government. |
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Term
| Marbury v. Madison; Marshall's Opinion |
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Definition
Marbury had a right to his commission.
Under a system of laws, rights must have remedies.
Judiciary Act of 1789 (section that authorizes Supreme Court to issue writs in cases such as this) alters the court's original jurisdiction.
This constitutes a fundamental change to the Constitution, which can only be changed through Amendment.
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of its meaning. |
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Term
| Marbury v. Madison; Marshall's Opinion |
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Definition
Marbury had a right to his commission.
Under a system of laws, rights must have remedies.
Judiciary Act of 1789 (section that authorizes Supreme Court to issue writs in cases such as this) alters the court's original jurisdiction.
This constitutes a fundamental change to the Constitution, which can only be changed through Amendment.
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of its meaning. |
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Term
| Marbury v. Madison; Marshall's Opinion |
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Definition
Marbury had a right to his commission.
Under a system of laws, rights must have remedies.
Judiciary Act of 1789 (section that authorizes Supreme Court to issue writs in cases such as this) alters the court's original jurisdiction.
This constitutes a fundamental change to the Constitution, which can only be changed through Amendment.
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of its meaning. |
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Term
| Marbury v. Madison; Marshall's Opinion |
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Definition
Marbury had a right to his commission.
Under a system of laws, rights must have remedies.
Judiciary Act of 1789 (section that authorizes Supreme Court to issue writs in cases such as this) alters the court's original jurisdiction.
This constitutes a fundamental change to the Constitution, which can only be changed through Amendment.
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of its meaning. |
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Term
| Martin v. Hunter Lessee; Opinion (Story) |
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Definition
| The Constitution was established by the people. Designed to give the people all powers necessary to general govt. People can prohibit states from exercising any powers that are incompatible with the object of general govt. Though states retain power, general language of the Constitution provides for legislature to adopt "its own means to effectuate legitimate objects" (116). This power must be exercised within constitutional boundaries but the Constitution clearly intended to operate state laws. Some say will no need for appellate power of US because state judges are bound by oath to support Constitution. But Const. recognizes that conflicts within and between states may disrupt administration of judges (Art. III, Section 2). Also, uniformity of decisions throughout US is important. Const. designed for benefit of all people of US. Section 25 of Judiciary Act is supported by letter and spirit of Constitution. |
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Term
| Chisolm vs. Georgia; Facts |
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Definition
| In 1777, the Executive Council of Georgia authorized the purchase of needed supplies from a South Carolina businessman. After receiving the supplies, Georgia did not deliver payments as promised. After the merchant's death, the executor of his estate, Alexander Chisholm, took the case to court in an attempt to collect from the state. Georgia maintained that it was a sovereign state not subject to the authority of the federal courts. |
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Term
| Chisolm vs. Georgia; Question of law |
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Definition
| Was the state of Georgia subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the federal government? |
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Term
| Chisolm vs. Georgia; Conclusion |
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Definition
| In a 4-to-1 decision, the justices held that "the people of the United States" intended to bind the states by the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the national government. The Court held that supreme or sovereign power was retained by citizens themselves, not by the "artificial person" of the State of Georgia. The Constitution made clear that controversies between individual states and citizens of other states were under the jurisdiction of federal courts. State conduct was subject to judicial review. |
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Term
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Definition
| The Pennsylvania legislature passed laws in 1788 and 1826 prohibiting the removal of Negroes out of the state for the purpose of enslaving them. In 1832, a black woman named Margaret Morgan moved from Maryland to Pennsylvania. Although she was never formally emancipated, her owner John Ashmore granted her virtually full freedom. Ashmore's heirs wanted her returned as a slave and sent Edward Prigg to capture her in Pennsylvania. After returning Morgan to Maryland, Prigg was convicted in a Pennsylvania court for violating the 1826 law. Prigg unsuccessfully argued before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that both the 1788 and 1826 laws violated the constitutional guarantee of extradition among states and the federal government's Fugitive Slave Law of 1793. |
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Term
| Prigg vs. PA; Question of Law |
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Definition
Did Pennsylvania's law prohibiting the extradition of Negroes to other states for the purpose of slavery violate Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution?(Yes)
Did the law violate the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 as applied by the Supremacy Clause? (Yes) |
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Term
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Definition
| Justice Joseph Story delivered the opinion of the Court. The 1788 and 1826 Pennsylvania laws contradicted Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution and the Fugitive Slave Law. The Supremacy Clause assured that federal laws prevailed over the state laws. The decision did not wholly end asylum across state lines for slaves. Story granted that the state laws put in place by slave states to recapture slaves in free states only had to be enforced by federal officials, and not state magistrates. |
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Term
| Dred Scott vs. Sandford; Facts |
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Definition
| Dred Scott was a slave in Missouri. From 1833 to 1843, he resided in Illinois (a free state) and in an area of the Louisiana Territory, where slavery was forbidden by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. After returning to Missouri, Scott sued unsuccessfully in the Missouri courts for his freedom, claiming that his residence in free territory made him a free man. Scott then brought a new suit in federal court. Scott's master maintained that no pure-blooded Negro of African descent and the descendant of slaves could be a citizen in the sense of Article III of the Constitution. |
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Term
| Dred Scott vs. Sandford; Question of Law |
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Definition
| Was Dred Scott free or slave? |
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Term
| Dred Scott vs. Sandford; Conclusion |
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Definition
| Dred Scott was a slave. Under Articles III and IV, argued Taney, no one but a citizen of the United States could be a citizen of a state, and that only Congress could confer national citizenship. Taney reached the conclusion that no person descended from an American slave had ever been a citizen for Article III purposes. The Court then held the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, hoping to end the slavery question once and for all. |
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Term
| City of NY vs. Miln; Facts |
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Definition
| A state law required all vessels docking in New York City to provide a list of passengers and to post security against the passengers from becoming public charges. Miln, the master of the ship "Emily," refused to comply with the law. The city sought to collect a penalty for Miln's failure to file the report. |
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Term
| City of NY vs. Miln; Questions of Law |
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Definition
| Does the New York law violate the Commerce Clause which vests all power over interstate and foreign commerce in Congress? |
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Term
| City of NY vs. Miln; Conclusion |
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Definition
| The Court upheld the state law. The justices ducked the Commerce Clause issue and invoked what was to become the state "police power" -- the right of a sovereign to take all necessary steps to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. According to Barbour, who wrote the majority opinion, a state is as competent "to provide precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possible convicts, as it is to guard against the physical pestilence, which may arise from unsound and infectious articles imported." The Court reversed Miln in 1941. (See Edwards v. California) |
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Term
| Worcester vs. Georgia; Facts |
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Definition
| In September 1831, Samuel A. Worcester and others, all non-Native Americans, were indicted in the supreme court for the county of Gwinnett in the state of Georgia for "residing within the limits of the Cherokee nation without a license" and "without having taken the oath to support and defend the constitution and laws of the state of Georgia." They were indicted under an 1830 act of the Georgia legislature entitled "an act to prevent the exercise of assumed and arbitrary power by all persons, under pretext of authority from the Cherokee Indians." Among other things, Worcester argued that the state could not maintain the prosecution because the statute violated the Constitution, treaties between the United States and the Cherokee nation, and an act of Congress entitled "an act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes." Worcester was convicted and sentenced to "hard labour in the penitentiary for four years." The U.S. Supreme Court received the case on a writ of error. |
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Term
| Worcester vs. Georgia; Question of Law |
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Definition
| Does the state of Georgia have the authority to regulate the intercourse between citizens of its state and members of the Cherokee Nation? |
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Term
| Worcester vs. Georgia; Conclusion |
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Definition
| No. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice John Marshall, the Court held that the Georgia act, under which Worcester was prosecuted, violated the Constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States. Noting that the "treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the Indian territory as completely separated from that of the states; and provide that all intercourse with them shall be carried on exclusively by the government of the union," Chief Justice Marshall argued, "The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory in which the laws of Georgia can have no force. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States." The Georgia act thus interfered with the federal government's authority and was unconstitutional. Justice Henry Baldwin dissented for procedural reasons and on the merits. |
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