“Economic problems of population change.” In The Evolution of Population Theory, edited by Johannes Overbeek. P. 140-152.

Discussion of the interrelationship between economics and population

- Believes that social, economic, and political difficulties will eventually check population growth either by increasing deaths or reducing births

- Begins by discussing the example of European fertility decline

- Death rates in Europe fell first while fertility rates lagged behind

- Notestein believes that this lag was due to the fact that social and economic institutions continued to value large families

- Agrarian societies rely on lots of children to help make a living

- Little value placed on individual achievement means that there is little else for adults to organize their lives around than childrearing

Mortality decline is a necessary but not sufficient conditions for fertility decline

Reasons why modern development eventually -> fertility decline

Shift toward secular individualism

   - Allows people to see fertility within the realm of conscious choice, rather than a result of the will of God

Increasing cost of children

  - This is partly due to declining value of child labor (and eventual restriction of child labor) in industrial societies

Growing importance of the individual

- In industrial societies individuals rely more on their own skills and achievements to make a living

- With this comes the increasing importance of education as a necessary tool to succeed; parents must therefore invest in their children’s education

- Better health means that individuals can develop their human capital early in life and wait longer to earn a living

- Appearance of alternatives to marriage and childrearing as a means of livelihood and prestige for women

- Increasing standard of living (which having more children depletes)

Notestein then considers whether or not fertility decline will follow a similar pattern in less developed countries

- Argues that they largely will, so long as they follow a similar path of economic development from agrarian to industrial societies

- However, because mortality rates are declining so quickly in developing countries and fertility rates tend to lag, they run the risk of huge population growth and the squalor that comes along with it

Notestein therefore argues that we should use public policy to lower birth rates in these countries

- Can try to increase age at marriage, increase birth control, reduce economic advantage of large families, and increase opportunities for women

- However, stimulating social change may cause political upheaval and deaths

- It is therefore essential to shift the values and attitude associated with childbearing too

Princeton Fertility Project Editors. and directors

Also: suggest that adaptors of parity specific control would have died out

“An economic analysis of fertility.” Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries. 225-256.

Objective of article is to develop an economic theory to explain variations in fertility in the US in the first half of the twentieth century

- The growth of knowledge about contraception gave parents more control over how many children to have

- Children can be thought of as a consumption good (like a car or house) in that they provide utility

- Parents decide how many children to have (quantity) and how much to spend on each child (quality)

- Becker predicts that a rise in individual income substantially increases the amount that couples spend on children and slightly increases the number of children desired

- Unlike Malthus, he does not believe that increases in income will lead to large increases in quantity of children

- Malthus did not recognize that couples would decrease their fertility in the face of reductions in child mortality

- Richer families spend more on children than poorer families; i.e. the rich have “higher quality children”

- Quantity is a close substitute for quality, therefore families with lots of kids spend less per child than families with fewer kids

Becker than examines his theory empirically

- At first glance, data suggests that wealthy families have fewer children than poor families

- Becker predicts that this may be due to poorer families’ lack of knowledge of contraceptive techniques, not to the preferences of rich versus poor families

- In fact, evidence suggests that rich families desire more children than poor families, although rich families tend to have fewer children

- Further evidence also suggests that as knowledge about contraception spread after WWII, the fertility of poor couples fell more than the fertility of rich couples

Thus, controlling for contraceptive knowledge and use reveals a positive relationship between income and fertility at the individual level (In 1960)

- At the macro level as well, cyclical variations in the business cycle correspond to changes in fertility

- When times are tough, fertility at the national level has fallen, and in times of prosperity it has risen

- However, one may argue that over time, per capita income in the US has risen while fertility has decreased

- Becker argues that this is attributable to a decline in child mortality, an increase in contraceptive knowledge, and a rise in the cost of children

- The cost of children has risen due to legislation prohibiting child labor and requiring education, as well as due to the movement of many families from rural to urban areas, where raising kids is more expensive

- In sum, “it seems that the negative correlation between the secular changes in fertility and income is not strong evidence against the hypothesis that an increase in income would cause an increase in fertility—tastes, costs, and knowledge remaining constant.”

“The demographic transition reconsidered.”

- Chapter considers the adequacy of demographic transition theory to explain trends in fertility during period of modernization in Europe

- Using data from the Princeton Fertility Project, develops a model which conceives of marital fertility (I_f) as a function of the proportion married (I_m) and the rate of fertility within marriage (I_g)

- Contrary to demographic transition theory, in many countries, the decline in fertility was not preceded by a decline in mortality

- It was also not preceded by a reduction in people’s biological capacity to have children due to urbanization (if anything, modernization -> better diets and health) or by new innovative in contraceptive technology (decline in fertility preceded new contraceptive methods)

- One pattern that is evident in the data is the regional clustering of fertility decline

- In light of this data, Coale argues that diverse circumstances can contribute to fertility decline

However, 3 general prerequisites for fertility decline are:

1. Fertility must be within the calculus of conscious choice

2. Reduced fertility must be advantageous

3. Effective techniques of fertility reduction must be available (and acceptable?)

Predicts a pattern of cyclical fertility

in which small cohorts would have more children due to better economic opportunities

(never occurred; small cohorts did not increase fertility following the baby bust).

 “An economic framework for fertility analysis.” Studies in Family Planning, 6(3), 54-63.

- Traditionally, economic theory has emphasized the demand for children and the costs of controlling fertility as keys to understanding fertility behavior

- Income, prices, and tastes determine household’s demand for children (C_d)

- What hasn’t been stressed as much is the production of children

- Sociologists have noted certain factors that determine natural fertility (C_n), such as frequency of intercourse, fecundity, and fetal mortality

If potential output is greater than demand, then the couple is motivated to regulate fertility

- Motivation is a necessary but not sufficient condition to engage in fertility regulation because regulation also has psychic and market costs associated with it

- If motivation to regulate fertility exceeds these costs, then deliberate limitations to fertility will occur

- This framework can be used to study nonmarital fertility in addition to marital fertility

- Consider increases in teenage pregnancy

- Some factors that have increased the potential output of children among young, unmarried women have been increased nutrition, which has decreased the average age of menarche, and reduction of taboos against teenage sex, which has led to increased frequency of intercourse

- Reduced costs to fertility limitation may also increase frequency of sex among this population

“The economics and sociology of fertility: A synthesis.” In Historical Studies of Changing Fertility, edited by Charles Tilly.  New Jersey: Princeton University Press.  Pp. 57-133.

Objective of chapter is to provide a framework for fertility decline that combines economic and sociological theories

- Economic theory has typically taken a demand approach to fertility

- A household’s demand for children is based on balancing its subjective tastes against externally determined constraints such as price and income in a way that maximizes its satisfaction

- The “income” that factors into fertility decisions includes all of the potential income of the hh; husband’s, wife’s, and children’s earnings over the course of the parents’ life cycle

- Research indicates that preferences for number of children tend to be larger in developing countries than in developed ones

- May be due to increased material and social aspirations available to people in advanced societies

- Sociological theory has typically taken a production approach to fertility

- The number of live births is seen as a function of natural fertility and the practice and efficiency of fertility regulation

- Davis and Blake (1956) propose a series of intermediate fertility variables that determine natural fertility and fertility regulation

- Primary determinants of natural fertility include frequency of intercourse, involuntary limits on fecundity, and fetal loss due to involuntary causes

- Motivation, attitudes (social norms), and access determine the use of fertility regulation

Synthesis

- Ideally, couples want to balance the number of desired children with the number of surviving children

- It is the prospective loss of welfare associated with unwanted children that provides the motivation for regulating fertility

- However, subjective and economic costs are also associated with fertility regulation, and may outweigh the potential costs of having more children than desired

- How this model accounts for the fertility decline associated with the demographic transition

The survival of more children leads to the motivation to regulate fertility

However, at first the costs associated with fertility regulation outweigh the desire to limit fertility

- As new contraceptive methods are developed and accepted by society, the costs associated with fertility regulation decrease and people begin to have fewer children

- Other factors associated with the dem trans also affect natural and desired fertility

- For instance, better public health and medical care likely increases natural fertility, growth in education and mass media likely decreases desired fertility, per capita income growth likely increases natural fertility but decreases desired fertility, etc.

- Modernization brought fertility decisions under the realm of conscious control and thus alters the essential nature of fertility regulation

- In premodern times, fertility was regulated by social and biological mechanisms operating through natural fertility (epidemics, plagues, diseases, accidents, etc.), and wasn’t viewed as hh problem of wanted versus unwanted fertility

The Effects of Infant and Child Mortality on Fertility. “Introduction.” New York, NY: Academic Press.

Aim of article is to evaluate how changes in child mortality may affect changes in fertility

- It has been theorized that a decline in child mortality is necessary for family planning to be effective because families need to bear fewer children to achieve a particular desired number of surviving children

Some mechanisms that link child mortality to fertility

Interval effect: the interval between births is elongated by breastfeeding; death of child -> less time spent breastfeeding -> smaller interval between births

Postpartum abstinence: Some cultures believe that if you get pregnant too soon after giving birth you will be stealing resources from newborn; this leads to taboo against sex after giving birth

- Particularly common in West Africa

Replacement strategy: Parents want to have x number of kids by the end of the reproductive period; if any die before end of period they try to replace them

Insurance strategy: Parents want to have x number of kids at some point in the future; they have more than x kids as a form of insurance against later deaths

Nevertheless, replacement is often incomplete because one child’s death often does not result in another child’s birth

Some reasons why replacement may be incomplete include . . .

- Couple has no target number of surviving children

- The target is so high it could not be achieved even if all children survived

- Targets are framed for one sex only

- Control of fertility is imperfect (couple may be unable to replace child even if they want to)

- Death produces a downward modification of target

- Child death was anticipated and additional children born as an insurance strategy

Some extrafamilial mechanisms that may also link mortality decline and fertility decline include decreased standard of living and/or increased migration associated with population growth

“Europe’s fertility transition: New evidence and lessons for today’s developing world.”

Review major findings from past studies on fertility decline in Western Europe

-Most of their data comes from the European Fertility Project

4 main findings from past work

1. The past was largely characterized by natural fertility (deliberate practice of family limitation was largely absent)

- This doesn’t mean, as some have argued, that couples in pre-transition societies have little motivation to limit births

- Many of these births were likely unwanted, but couples didn’t posses the knowledge of or didn’t accepted methods of birth control

- High infant or child mortality may have been the result of unconscious efforts to eliminate unwanted children

2. The shift from high to low fertility was mostly the result of fertility limitation within marriage, and once started it was an irreversible process

3. The onset of the fertility decline took place under a wide variety of demographic and socioeconomic conditions

4. Differences in the start and speed of the fertility decline seem to have been determined more by the cultural setting than by socioeconomic conditions

- For example, French-speaking regions of Belgium underwent the decline together, while Flemish-speaking regions lagged behind

- Main argument of paper is that the diffusion of the idea of family limitation was an essential component of the fertility transition

- Finally, authors list implications for limiting growth in today’s developing countries

the first transition was motivated primarily by altruistic concerns for the wellbeing of children,

(whereas the second transition was motivated by increasing individualism - later noted by van de Kaa and Lesthaeghe)

 “Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework.” In The Fertility Revolution. Pp. 12-31.

Authors propose 3 economic fertility determinants that mediate the relationship between economic and social conditions and proximate determinants of fertility that are under an individual’s control (contraception, abortion)

- All of the basic determinants of fertility work through one or more of the following economic determinants to influence proximate determinants

First, demand for children

- The number of surviving children that parents would want if fertility regulation was costless

- Determined by income, price, and tastes

Second, the supply of children

- Number of surviving children a couple would have if they made no attempt to limit fertility

- Determined by natural fertility and child mortality

Third, the costs of fertility regulation

- Couple’s attitude toward and access to fertility controls

- As long as demand for children is higher than supply of children, parents won’t be motivated to regulate fertility

- When demand for children is less than supply, and when contraception becomes widely accepted and available, fertility begins to fall

- For a while, supply of children will persist at a level higher than demand

- Not until the point of “perfect contraception” will demand for children = supply of children

- Different aspects of modernization (such as public health, education, urbanization, new consumer goods, new methods of birth control, and new family planning programs) affect fertility via these 3 variables

- More empirical research on exactly how and to what extent these aspects of modernization impact these 3 economic variables is necessary

- This line of research prompted trends in the 1990s to fill an unmet need for contraception in developing countries

Martial fertility declined in Europe

France was way ahead

Marriage rates fell, delayed marriage and more nuns/spinsters

(what time period?)

“Conclusions.” In The Decline of Fertility in Europe.  Edited by Ansley J. Coale and Susan Cotts Watkins.  Guildford, Surrey: Princeton University Press.  Ch. 11.

The two goals of the European Fertility Project were:

1. to create a quantitative record of fertility in each of the several hundred provinces in Europe during the period of major decline and

2. to determine the social and economic conditions that led to this decline

- Because demographic transition theory is supposed to predict future patterns in developing countries, the project also wanted to examine whether or not these patterns held in all or most of Europe

- Watkins distinguishes between nuptiality and marital fertility when describing declines in fertility

- Creates and index of marital fertility I_g and an index of nuptiality I_m  to compare rates of fertility and nuptiality to the Hutterite population in the United States (population with highest observed levels of fertility)

Summary of major findings from the European Fertility Project

- Original fertility rates lower than originally believed

- Large fluctuations in pre-transition fertility (primarily driven by fluctuations in nuptiality)

- Decreases in fertility rates during the transition mostly due to decreases in marital fertility

Some major explanations for fertility decline

- Decreases in infant and child mortality, increased urbanization, changing roles of women, increased education

- However, evidence for these explanations was surprisingly weak

- Watkins argues that local norms were the primary drivers to fertility decline

- Many of the researchers on the European Fertility Project found that clusters of provinces went through the transition together, even though some of the provinces had not yet experienced modernization

- This was especially true of provinces that shared a language, culture, etc.

- Stark similarities in nuptiality and marital fertility rates in geographically and culturally similar provinces

- Thus, certain economic and social conditions may have been necessary for fertility rates to begin to fall in some provinces, but once this decline in fertility rates started, it quickly spread to nearby provinces even if they hadn’t experienced these social and economic changes

Theory of ideational change

- Fertility transitions arise due to the diffusion of new information and new social norms about birth control

-Critic: This theory does little to explain fertility patterns in regions like Africa where number of surviving children, rather than number of births, is the main factor driving fertility

Axinn 1993

finds children's education matters for the fertility transitions.

From the economic perspective may relate to costs of children i.e. beckers argument for a higher quality child

categorizes countries into groups representing different types of labor market, state, and family to show how fertility in social-democratic countries like Norway differs from fertility in conservative regimes like Italy

“Gender equity in theories of fertility transition.” Population and Development Review, 26(3), 427-439.

Main argument is that high levels of gender equity in individual institutions combined with low levels of gender equity in family institutions contribute to very low fertility

- This accounts for below replacement level fertility in many developed countries today

- A certain degree of gender equity within families is necessary for women to feel like they have control over their fertility decisions

- Thus, it contributes to fertility decline of the first demographic transition

- Gender equity is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for initial fertility decline

- Recently, there have been large increases in gender equity in more individual-oriented institutions (workplace, politics, education, etc.) in developed countries

- However, gender equity in families has been slower to change (gender still determines who does childcare and housework)

- Women who want to enjoy the benefits of individual institutions have no choice but to have fewer children

- Until gender equity in families matches gender equity outside of the home, fertility will likely remain very low

“The changing institutional context of low fertility.” Population Research and Policy Review, 22, 411-438.

- Until the 1980s, the association between country-level TFR and female labor force participation (FLFP) was negative

- During the 1980s, a shift occurred and this relationship became positive

- Since 1990 it has been strongly positive

- Incompatibility of work and family roles undoubtedly contributed to the negative association between TFR and FLFP

- Work and family incompatible because of the opportunity costs of foregone wages and the time pressures of managing both roles

- This incompatibility has affected women more than men because women typically take responsibility for childrearing

- However, the incompatibility of work and child-rearing is not a given; it varies over time and across countries

3 ways to reconciles work and childrearing are:

1. providing child-care,

2. offering flexible work hours, or

3. shifting gender roles so men take on more childrearing responsibilities

- Those countries that have minimized incompatibility between work and childrearing are likely to see high proportions of women who are working and mothers

- In contrast, countries that do not minimize incompatibility are likely to have low proportions working and mothers, because women have to choose between the two roles         

- Nevertheless, it is conceivable that other factors contributed to declining fertility in countries with low FLFP:

a. such as high unemployment rates, or

b. the particular familial and kinship patterns of certain countries

“Infant mortality, social networks, and subsequent fertility.” American Sociological Review, 71, 288-309.

Objective of paper is to study how social learning about child mortality impacts individual fertility

- Thus far, very little evidence has linked macro-level trends in child mortality to individual fertility decisions

- Focuses on the small Nepalese village of Timling

- Hypothesizes that the higher child mortality is within a woman’s social network the higher her risk of childbirth will be

- Gives survey to every woman in village aged 15+ and tells them to indicate important others in their social network

- Also tracks infant mortality within a woman’s family and among others in social network

Results

- Small effect of extra-familial infant mortality on fertility, even controlling for intra-familial infant mortality

- Significant interaction of extra-familial infant mortality and variance of mortality on risk of childbearing

- Suggests that interpersonal interaction is an important source of info for women when making fertility decisions, especially when one can be relatively certain that the info is accurate (i.e. when there is low variance in infant mortality among others in social network)

commonly credited with an ideational model of fertility change – diffusion