the first transition was motivated primarily by altruistic concerns for the wellbeing of children,

(whereas the second transition was motivated by increasing individualism - later noted by van de Kaa and Lesthaeghe)

“The baby boom and its explanations.” The Sociological Quarterly, 24(3), 353-365.

2 main trends in fertility in the postwar era

1.  Increase in fertility through the late 1950s (baby boom)

2. Rise in frequency and effectiveness of contraception during the 1960s

Demographic features of the baby boom

- The TFR was about 2.2 during the mid-1930s, 3.6 during the baby boom, ad 1.8 during the mid-1970s

- Ryder (1980) demonstrated that the period fertility rate can change even if the cohort fertility rate remains unchanged

- He showed that the increase in period fertility was due more to the timing of births than the changes in quantum

- However, not a significant portion of the baby boom was still due to quantum

- Much greater proportion of women having two children (82% of 1933 cohort had at least 2 kids), rather than some families with at least two children going on to have more

In sum, the baby boom consisted of the following 4 phenomena:

1. Women marrying and having first births earlier after the war

2. A larger proportion of women having at least 2 kids

3. A larger proportion of women having families of the same size (2-4 kids)

4. A slight increase in average family size, owing to increases in unintended fertility

Explanations for these patterns

- Shift toward values of family and traditionalism

- Post-war economic prosperity

- Social-psychological effects of growing up during the depression (Elder)

- Easterlin hypothesis that cohort size affects relative economic status (small cohorts during depression)

“An economic analysis of fertility.” Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries. 225-256.

Objective of article is to develop an economic theory to explain variations in fertility in the US in the first half of the twentieth century

- The growth of knowledge about contraception gave parents more control over how many children to have

- Children can be thought of as a consumption good (like a car or house) in that they provide utility

- Parents decide how many children to have (quantity) and how much to spend on each child (quality)

- Becker predicts that a rise in individual income substantially increases the amount that couples spend on children and slightly increases the number of children desired

- Unlike Malthus, he does not believe that increases in income will lead to large increases in quantity of children

- Malthus did not recognize that couples would decrease their fertility in the face of reductions in child mortality

- Richer families spend more on children than poorer families; i.e. the rich have “higher quality children”

- Quantity is a close substitute for quality, therefore families with lots of kids spend less per child than families with fewer kids

Becker than examines his theory empirically

- At first glance, data suggests that wealthy families have fewer children than poor families

- Becker predicts that this may be due to poorer families’ lack of knowledge of contraceptive techniques, not to the preferences of rich versus poor families

- In fact, evidence suggests that rich families desire more children than poor families, although rich families tend to have fewer children

- Further evidence also suggests that as knowledge about contraception spread after WWII, the fertility of poor couples fell more than the fertility of rich couples

Thus, controlling for contraceptive knowledge and use reveals a positive relationship between income and fertility at the individual level (In 1960)

- At the macro level as well, cyclical variations in the business cycle correspond to changes in fertility

- When times are tough, fertility at the national level has fallen, and in times of prosperity it has risen

- However, one may argue that over time, per capita income in the US has risen while fertility has decreased

- Becker argues that this is attributable to a decline in child mortality, an increase in contraceptive knowledge, and a rise in the cost of children

- The cost of children has risen due to legislation prohibiting child labor and requiring education, as well as due to the movement of many families from rural to urban areas, where raising kids is more expensive

- In sum, “it seems that the negative correlation between the secular changes in fertility and income is not strong evidence against the hypothesis that an increase in income would cause an increase in fertility—tastes, costs, and knowledge remaining constant.”

“On the quantum and tempo of fertility.” Population and Development Review, 24(2), 271-291.

The main advantage of the period TFR is that it measures current age-specific fertility and therefore gives up-to-date information on levels and trends

-In addition, it is simple to interpret

Main disadvantage is that it doesn’t reflect the actual experience of any cohort of women

- Although the cohort TFR has the advantage of representing the actual fertility experience of a group of women, it has the disadvantage of representing past experience because women currently age 50 did most of their childbearing decades ago

The purpose of this paper is to develop a measure of the period TFR that is free of tempo effects (distortions due to changes in the timing of births)

- This will measure just the quantum component of the TFR (the TFR that would have been observed in the absence of changes in the timing of births)

- New measure called the tempo-adjusted tempo-adjusted TFR

- The main problem to be dealt with is that a decreasing mean age at childbearing artificially inflates the TFR, whereas an increasing mean age at childbearing automatically deflates the TFR

- Bongaarts and Feeney derive the tempo-adjusted TFR by dividing the observed TFR at parity i by (1-r_i) where r_i is the change in the mean age at childbearing at order i during the year

- The tempo-adjusted TFR (TFR*) simply equals the sum of the parity-specific TFRs

- If the mean age at childbearing increases by 0.2 years, the number of births in year t will be 20% lower than they would have been in the absence of this change

- Likewise, if the mean age at childbearing decreases by 0.2 years, the number of births will by 20% higher

- It is easy to distinguish between tempo and quantum effects because tempo effects involve a change in the mean age at childbearing whereas quantum effects do not

Advantages of this method

- Only need data from one period

Challenges of method

- Need to be able to discern birth parity

Assumptions of this method

- Women of all ages bearing children in year t defer or advance their births to the same extent, regardless of age or cohort identification

- This assumption is likely violated during periods of war, famine, etc. when fertility changes rapidly from one year to the next and cohort effects are not negligible

In other words, period effects, rather than cohort effects, are the primary force in fertility change

 “Social interactions and contemporary fertility transitions.” Population and Development Review, 22(4), 639-682.

- Begins with description of patterns of fertility transitions in the developing world

- Between the early 1960s and late 1980s, fertility for the developing world as a whole declined from 6.0 to 3.8 births per woman

- Most rapid declines in Asia and Latin America, followed by North Africa and the Middle East

- Little decline in Sub-Saharan Africa

- One objective of present study is to assess the extent to which the observed variation among developing countries in fertility levels and trends can be accounted for by conventional measures of development

- Using the UN’s Human Development Index, authors find that there is a negative relationship between level of development and fertility, but that fertility still varies quite a bit at any given level of development

- Evidence from the Princeton Fertility Project suggests that in Europe regions tend to experience the transition at pretty much the same time, regardless of population’s individual level of development

- Furthermore, authors find that over time, lower level of development is needed to achieve transition onset

- Propose a “moving threshold model” (first countries to sustain fertility decline within a region do so only after having achieved relatively high level of development; once a few countries have entered transition the threshold drops for remaining countries)

- Also find that the level of development of a country at the beginning of the transition is associated with the pace of fertility change

- Perhaps this is because the level of unwanted fertility is higher in countries at higher levels of development?

- To explain these trends, authors propose a theory of social interaction

- By social interaction they mean the process of spreading ideas and information

3 aspects of social interaction that a likely relevant for fertility change

1. the exchange of info and ideas,

2. the evaluation of these ideas and info, and

3. the social influence that constrains or encourages action

“A framework for analyzing the proximate determinants of fertility.” Population and Development Review, 4(1), 105-132.

Objective of paper is to develop a model for how intermediate variables affect the total fertility rate

- The intermediate fertility variables are those that have a direct bearing on fertility; they are determined by various socioeconomic, cultural, and environmental variables

- The value of the intermediate fertility variables is that they allow for the identification of paths through which different social variables affect fertility

8 intermediate fertility variables were proposed by Kingsley and Blake (1956); these were

1) proportion married,

2) contraception,

3) induced abortion,

4) lactational infecundability,

5) frequency of intercourse,

6) sterility,

7) spontaneous intrauterine mortality, and

8) duration of the fertile period

- Variations in fertility can alwaus be traced to variations in one or more of these intermediate variables

- However, each variable’s degree of influence depends on societal factors

- According to Bongaarts, 4 of these 8 variables can be controlled by individuals and are responsible for most of deviations from natural fertility:

1. the proportion married at each age,

2. prevalence of abortion,

3. prevalence and effectiveness of contraception, and

4. length of infecund period following a birth

- It is important to note that an induced abortion always averts less than one birth because it may have been unnecessary if the baby dies anyways and because a woman resumes ovulation much sooner if she has an abortion than if she carries her baby to term

Bongaarts calculates the total natural fertility rate (TF) to be approximately 15.3 births per women

- This is how many births a woman would have if every fecund women were married and exposed to the risk of pregnancy, no one used contraception, no one had an abortion, and no one breastfed or abstained from sex following a birth

- One question remains regarding the role of nutrition and health in determining fertility

Bongaarts argues that overall, nutrition has little direct influence on fertility

However, it can be indirectly linked to fertility by affecting infant mortality, adult mortality (and the risk of widowhood), and perhaps by affecting the length of the period of lactational infecundability

- In light of the above discussion, Bongaarts calculates the following model for the TFR as a function of these 4 intermediate variables

TFR = TF * Cm * Cc * Ca * Ci

TF=Natural Fertility (15.3)

- Cm, Cc, Ca, and Ci are indices of marriage, contraception, abortion, and infecundability

- Range from 0 (indicating total inhibition of fertility) to 1 (indicating no inhibition of fertility)

- Using this model, Bongaarts finds that the primary driver of American fertility decline from 1965-1973 was an increase in the use and effectiveness of contraception

“The fertility-inhibiting effects of the intermediate fertility variables.” Studies in Family Planning, 13(6/7), 179-189.

Paper is to demonstrates that differences in fertility among populations are primarily due to variations in only four intermediate fertility variables

- Uses the following model to estimate the TFR from the 4 intermediate fertility variables, and compares these estimates to the actual TFRs from various countries

            TFR = TF *Cm *Cc *Ca *Ci

- Finds that these 4 variables explains 96% of the variance in the TFR from 41 populations

- The variance in the TFR that is not explained by these factors is due to errors in measurement of the intermediate variables, deviations in total fecundity from 15.3, errors in observed TFRs, absence of data on induced abortions, and inclusion of illegitimate births from developing countries

Then analyses the role of each of these 4 variables in the reduction of fertility over the course of the demographic transition

1. The main reason for the decline in fertility is the increase in contraceptive use and effectiveness

2. Marriage also plays a role as women begin to marry later

3. The mean duration of postpartum infecundability actually falls over the course of the transition because fewer women breastfeed in more developed societies

4. The prevalence of induced abortion plays almost no role

“Population policy options in the developing world.” Science, 263.

-Most of the world’s current population growth is occurring in developing countries

- Population of the developing world expected to grow from 4.1 billion in 1990 to 8.6 billion in 2050

- Purpose of this article is to assess past policies for curbing population growth and suggest alternatives for developing countries today

Past policies

- Family planning policies emerged in the 1950s

- India was actually the first country to adopt such a policy

- By the 1970s family planning had become a worldwide social movement

- China adopted one-child policy in 1978

- However, family planning programs have not been very effective in many countries

3 broad policy options to reduce population growth

1. Reduce unwanted pregnancies

- Surveys indicate unmet need for contraception in many developing countries due to lack of knowledge or contraceptive methods, limited access to family planning services, fear of side effects, disapproval of husbands and other family members, and cost

2. Reduce demand for large families by investing in human development

- Some development factors that are potentially under government control are education, status of women, and child mortality

3. Address population momentum

- 2 ways to do this include bringing births to below replacement level (equal number of births and deaths) or by raising the average age of women at childbearing

- Even if no change in the number of births occurs, raising the age of women at childbearing will have a temporary reduction on the growth rate

- Raising age of women at childbearing could be brought about by emphasizing female education, addressing teen pregnancy

One advantage of Bongaarts’ policy options is that they would reduce fertility without resorting to measures that would raise objections from the majority of the world community

“Fertility and reproductive preferences in post-transitional societies.” Population and Development Review, 27, 260-281.

Objective of paper is to examine the relationship between reproductive preferences and observed fertility

- Theories of fertility often assume that couples are able to implement their fertility preferences without much difficulty, but empirical research suggests this is not the case

- For instance, in most developed countries, desired fertility is about 2.0, but observed fertility is below this

- Below-replacement fertility has also been observed in some developing populations, particularly in Southeast Asia

Trends in observed and desired fertility

- Early in the fertility transition, desired fertility exceeded observed

3 reasons why observed exceeded desired

1. Unwanted fertility (typically not high prior to the transition, but increases during the transition when desired fertility drops before observed)

2. Replacement of deceased children

3. Sex preferences

As populations progress through the last stages of the transition, observed fertility usually decreases to a level below desired fertility

3 reasons why observed fertility below desired fertility

1. Rising age at childbearing (tempo effects have temporary implications for the TFR, but foregone childbearing has permanent implications)

2 Involuntary infertility (4 reasons for this are

1) Inability to find a suitable partner,

2) Union disruption,

3) Physiological sterility,

4) Disease-induced sterility)

3. Competing preferences

- Although there are reasons to be concerned about currently low levels of fertility, this may be a temporary phenomenon

- Bongaarts believes we should really start to worry when desired, rather than observed fertility, drops below 2.0

Conceptual model of the factors affecting the period TFR

- A woman’s observed fertility results from her intended fertility multiplied by a set of factors that are not or cannot be subsumed under her fertility intentions

- These factors are unwanted fertility, gender preferences, replacement effects, tempo effects, infecundability, and competition

- A parameter of greater than 1.0 for these factors indicate that they increase fertility relative to intentions, and a parameter of less than 1.0 indicates that they decrease fertility relative to intentions

 “The causes of stalling fertility transitions.” Studies in Family Planning, 37(1), 1-16

- Paper examines the causes of stalling in 7 countries in which fertility did not decline between two Demographic and Health Surveys, despite being in the middle of their fertility transition

- Finds that stall was accompanied by a leveling off of demand for contraception and contraceptive use

- No common trend in socioeconomic determinants of stall and no association between access to birth control and stall

- However, 5 of the 7 countries displayed fertility that was unusually low given their level of economic development

- In order to end fertility stalls, public policy must somehow decrease women’s desired level of fertility

- Improvements in socioeconomic conditions and investments in human capital (particularly female education) may be effective

While TFR declined since 1960, the % women with at least one child is relatively constant

Argues for later marriage.

Secular trends have reduced the socioeconomic motivations for high-parity births, but they have not eliminated the motivation to have children altogether

“Toward a reinstatement of demographic transition theory.” Population and Development Review, 2(3/4), 321-366.

Main argument of paper is that fertility behavior is economically rational; i.e. that fertility is high or low as a result of the economic benefit to couples, individuals, or families

There exist 2 types of fertility regimes

1. No economic gain from restriction of fertility

- Wealth flows from children to parents

- This is common in agricultural societies where children can help tend to the farm

- Also common in smaller, primitive communities, where the size of one’s family may determine one’s share of political representation

2. Economic gain from restriction of fertility

- Wealth flows from parents to children

- A shift from the 1^st to the 2^nd type of regime can only occur after the emotional and economic nucleation of the family

 Some factors that may have contributed to the nucleation of the family in Western countries include:

- The feudal system, which was inherited from the urbanized empires of the ancient world

- Protestantism, which emphasizes self-sufficiency

- All in all, Caldwell admits that he doesn’t have a good idea about why the family was economically nucleated in the West

- Shift from 1^st to 2^nd regime in the developing world primarily the result of social change rather than the result of modernization

- Acceptance of Western values have led parents in developing countries (particularly in Africa, where the data for this paper comes from) to invest more in their children

- The mass media has played a large role in the transmission of Western values

- However, Caldwell notes that it’s not as if all pre-transition societies have as many kids as possible and all post-transition societies have zero kids; factors other than pure economic rationality due play a role (psychological, physiological, social, etc.)

“Unmet need for family planning in developing countries and implications for public policy.” Population and Development Review, 26(4), 691-723.

- Unmet need for family planning refers to the condition of wanting to avoid or postpone childbearing but not using any method of contraception; also known as the:

KAP gap for knowledge, attitudes, and practice regarding family planning

Objective of paper is to examine the utility of unmet need for family planning as an organizing concept for population policies and for reproductive health and family planning programs

- History of research on unmet need for contraception

- The so-called KAP surveys of the 1960s showed that in nearly all societies a discrepancy existed between women’s reproductive preferences and behavior

- The World Fertility Surveys (WFS) of the 1970s and 80s had surprisingly little to say on the subject

- Greater attention was paid to the unmet need for contraception in the Contraceptive Prevalence Surveys (CPS), which ran from 1978-1984

- An analysis published in 1994 by Sinding et al. showed that in nearly all countries with specified demographic fertility targets, satisfying the unmet need for contraception would obviate the need for such targets

- As a result, reducing unmet need became a target in itself rather than a means for achieving demographic goals

Debate regarding the validity of the concept

- Some have argued that unmet need does not refer to a valid behavioral phenomenon because women in surveys are typically not asked directly about whether they perceive any inconsistency between their fertility preferences and contraceptive practice

- Unmet need is therefore based on inferences made by the researcher that women who state a desire to postpone or terminate childbearing would like to take actions to avoid births and that this action should take the form of contraception

- However, qualitative research indicates that unmet need really is a valid phenomenon

Usefulness of the concept for explaining the fertility transition

- Some researchers have argued that reducing unmet need does not explain fertility reductions above and beyond reducing the desire for children

- Empirical research by Feyisetan and Casterline (2000) suggests this is not the case; substantial increases in contraceptive prevalence can be achieved in the absence of changes in the demand for children through the satisfaction of already-existing demand for fertility regulation

Usefulness of the concept for family planning and policy

- Some have argued that if women really wanted to regulate their fertility they would find the means to do so

- However, this overlooks the role of competing preferences

- Most research indicates that inadequate access to contraception is not one of the predominant causes of unmet need

3 main causes of unmet need are:

1. lack of necessary knowledge about contraceptive methods,

2. social opposition to their use (primarily perceived opposition from husbands) and

3. health concerns about possible side effects

Policies that aim to increase contraceptive use must focus on eliminating these obstacles

Theory of ideational change

- Fertility transitions arise due to the diffusion of new information and new social norms about birth control

-Critic: This theory does little to explain fertility patterns in regions like Africa where number of surviving children, rather than number of births, is the main factor driving fertility

Coale and Trussel (1974; 1978) model of marital fertility

- The Coale and Trussel model expresses marital fertility at age ‘a’ r(a) as a function of:

M, the ratio of actual marital fertility at age ‘a’ r(a) to expected marital fertility at age ‘a’ in the absence of parity-related limitations n(a), and

m, a measure of the extent to which parity-related limitation affects age-specific marital fertility rates

- Lower values of m indicate less of an effect of parity-specific measures on the reduction of marital fertility, whereas higher values of M indicate less of an effect of parity-specific measures on reduction of marital fertility

“Model fertility schedules: Variations in the age structure of childbearing in human populations.” Population Index, 40(2), 185-258.

­

Coale-Trussell Model of Fertility

- Coale and Trussell aim to examine the nature of the roots of a set of fertility functions expressing the full variety of fertility experience found in large human populations, and attempt to create a family of model fertility schedules encompassing the full range of human experience

- Express fertility as a function of the proportion married at each age and the age specific fertility rates within marriage

f(a) = G(a) * r(a)

- Multiplying together these two model subschedules (proportions even married at each age and proportion of married women at each age experiencing a live birth) should result in the age specific fertility rate

2 parameters necessary to calculate the age structure of the proportion ever married (ie, the G(a) function)

1. These are the age of initiation of first marriage and

2, The pace of first marriage relative to a standard (in this case, nineteenth century Sweden)

- The ultimate proportion ever married is important for determining the level, but not the age pattern, of nuptiality

- The ratio of observed marital fertility to natural fertility is a function of this ratio at one particular age (M) (Coale and Trussell recommend using the age group 20-24) and a scalar that expresses contraceptive prevalence (or the difference between observed and natural fertility) at each age (m)

 In other words:

r(a) / n(a) = Mexp(m*v(a))

- v(a), like n(a) is observed empirically, and expresses the tendency for older women in populations using contraception to effect particularly large reductions in fertility

The age pattern of fertility is therefore given by the following equation

                       f(a) = G(a)*n(a)*e^m*v(a)

Coale and Trussell also argue that these models can account for fertility outside of marriage, by simply adjusting the parameters to account for an earlier age of onset of sexual activity or additional contraceptive prevalence at ages with high rates of divorce

“The demographic transition reconsidered.”

- Chapter considers the adequacy of demographic transition theory to explain trends in fertility during period of modernization in Europe

- Using data from the Princeton Fertility Project, develops a model which conceives of marital fertility (I_f) as a function of the proportion married (I_m) and the rate of fertility within marriage (I_g)

- Contrary to demographic transition theory, in many countries, the decline in fertility was not preceded by a decline in mortality

- It was also not preceded by a reduction in people’s biological capacity to have children due to urbanization (if anything, modernization -> better diets and health) or by new innovative in contraceptive technology (decline in fertility preceded new contraceptive methods)

- One pattern that is evident in the data is the regional clustering of fertility decline

- In light of this data, Coale argues that diverse circumstances can contribute to fertility decline

However, 3 general prerequisites for fertility decline are:

1. Fertility must be within the calculus of conscious choice

2. Reduced fertility must be advantageous

3. Effective techniques of fertility reduction must be available (and acceptable?)

 “The Decline of Fertility in Europe since the Eighteenth Century as a Chapter in Demographic History.” In The Decline of Fertility in Europe.  Edited by Ansley J. Coale and Susan Cotts Watkins.  Guildford, Surrey: Princeton University Press.  Ch. 1.

Summary of the historical context of fertility decline that prompted the Princeton Fertility Project

- For the majority of human history, growth rates were near zero

- Since 1750, growth rates have increased dramatically; only since about 1970 have the begun decelerating

- Coale believes that various homeostatic mechanisms have kept birth rates roughly in line with death rates throughout human history

- Malthus proposed various positive checks to population growth, such as more contagion, more contamination, and less adequate nutrition

- Although some demographers have postulated that pre-transition fertility rates must have been quite high to offset death rates, Coale finds that fertility rates at this time were actually quite moderate (in the realm of TFRs of 4-6)

- What factors contributed to moderate fertility in pre-transition populations?

- Henry (1961) distinguishes between non-parity specific fertility measures (measures that serve to reduce births but are unrelated to number of prior children) and parity specific fertility measures (measures used to reduce births after desired number already born)

- Coale argues that non-parity specific measures—specifically low proportions of married women—contributed to moderate fertility in pre-transition populations

- In contrast, reduction in fertility during the transition was due to parity specific measures, including abstinence w/in marriage, birth control, and abortion

- Uses the Coale and Trussel (1974; 1978) model of marital fertility to provide evidence for this argument

- The Coale and Trussel model expresses marital fertility at age ‘a’ r(a) as a function of M, the ratio of actual marital fertility at age ‘a’ r(a) to expected marital fertility at age ‘a’ in the absence of parity-related limitations n(a), and m, a measure of the extent to which parity-related limitation affects age-specific marital fertility rates

- Lower values of m indicate less of an effect of parity-specific measures on the reduction of marital fertility, whereas higher values of M indicate less of an effect of parity-specific measures on reduction of marital fertility

- Coale recognizes, however, that select pre-industrial populations were using parity-specific measures to reduce fertility (for instance, the nobility in France, England, and Italy, the Jews in Italy, and the rural population in France)

- While pre-industrial populations exhibit a decent amount of variation in fertility rates, fertility rates in developed societies are much more similar

- Differing marriage rates explain most of the variation in fertility amidst pre-transition societies

- Marriage acts as a sort of homeostatic mechanism to regulate population size in good and bad times

Martial fertility declined in Europe

France was way ahead

Marriage rates fell, delayed marriage and more nuns/spinsters

(what time period?)

1983 - US law against sharing obsense, lewd, lavious material in the mail.

Keeps porn out of the mail, but also keeps info about controception and methods

(French secret)

Multiphasic response theory

First, even if mortality does decline, families may deal with the prospective survival of many children (and the potential decline in standard of living) in ways other than limiting fertility such as:

1. sending the children to work as servants,

2. by having them migrate overseas, or

3. even by choosing to delay marriage

“Population policy dilemmas in Europe at the dawn of the twenty-first century.” Population and Development Review, 29(1), 1-28.

Discussion of political and social problems inherent in Europe’s population predicament

- The intrinsic rate of growth in Europe based on current levels of fertility and mortality is -0.0146

- Such a decline would bring the population to half its current size in 47 years

- Comparison of growth between 1950 and 2050 in Russia and Yemen reveals drastic nature of this phenomenon

- Russia projected to decline by 40 million people between 2000 and 2050

- Yemen projected to increase by 81 million people between 2000 and 2050

- This would bring its population to 102 million, which is more than 24 times its size in 1950!

- This comparison is emblematic of future global demographic picture; Europe projected to shrink while countries in North and West Africa (Europe’s southern hinterland) expected to grow by enormous amounts

Potential policy responses

1. Do nothing and embrace reduced population size

 - Has the benefit of easing strain on natural resources

- However, large population size may also be linked to political and military power, so Europe may not want to let these go

2. Governments could also attempt to raise fertility

- However, this goes against a long tradition of laissez-faire  governance, where governments stayed out of personal decisions

- The most common “pronatalist” policy today is to make participation for women in the labor force compatible with raising children

- These types of policies could backfire if they result in the devaluation of parenthood and ultimately serve to lower fertility

- Governments have also tried to provide monetary incentives to parents, but these do not appear to have had large effects of couple’s fertility decisions

3. Finally, governments could embrace immigrants

- Although there has been a lot of resistance to embracing immigration, Demeny thinks that continued immigration is inevitable

- Although this may not be enough to halt the current population decline in Europe, it will moderate it considerably

 “Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework.” In The Fertility Revolution. Pp. 12-31.

Authors propose 3 economic fertility determinants that mediate the relationship between economic and social conditions and proximate determinants of fertility that are under an individual’s control (contraception, abortion)

- All of the basic determinants of fertility work through one or more of the following economic determinants to influence proximate determinants

First, demand for children

- The number of surviving children that parents would want if fertility regulation was costless

- Determined by income, price, and tastes

Second, the supply of children

- Number of surviving children a couple would have if they made no attempt to limit fertility

- Determined by natural fertility and child mortality

Third, the costs of fertility regulation

- Couple’s attitude toward and access to fertility controls

- As long as demand for children is higher than supply of children, parents won’t be motivated to regulate fertility

- When demand for children is less than supply, and when contraception becomes widely accepted and available, fertility begins to fall

- For a while, supply of children will persist at a level higher than demand

- Not until the point of “perfect contraception” will demand for children = supply of children

- Different aspects of modernization (such as public health, education, urbanization, new consumer goods, new methods of birth control, and new family planning programs) affect fertility via these 3 variables

- More empirical research on exactly how and to what extent these aspects of modernization impact these 3 economic variables is necessary

- This line of research prompted trends in the 1990s to fill an unmet need for contraception in developing countries

Predicts a pattern of cyclical fertility

in which small cohorts would have more children due to better economic opportunities

(never occurred; small cohorts did not increase fertility following the baby bust).

 “An economic framework for fertility analysis.” Studies in Family Planning, 6(3), 54-63.

- Traditionally, economic theory has emphasized the demand for children and the costs of controlling fertility as keys to understanding fertility behavior

- Income, prices, and tastes determine household’s demand for children (C_d)

- What hasn’t been stressed as much is the production of children

- Sociologists have noted certain factors that determine natural fertility (C_n), such as frequency of intercourse, fecundity, and fetal mortality

If potential output is greater than demand, then the couple is motivated to regulate fertility

- Motivation is a necessary but not sufficient condition to engage in fertility regulation because regulation also has psychic and market costs associated with it

- If motivation to regulate fertility exceeds these costs, then deliberate limitations to fertility will occur

- This framework can be used to study nonmarital fertility in addition to marital fertility

- Consider increases in teenage pregnancy

- Some factors that have increased the potential output of children among young, unmarried women have been increased nutrition, which has decreased the average age of menarche, and reduction of taboos against teenage sex, which has led to increased frequency of intercourse

- Reduced costs to fertility limitation may also increase frequency of sex among this population

“The economics and sociology of fertility: A synthesis.” In Historical Studies of Changing Fertility, edited by Charles Tilly.  New Jersey: Princeton University Press.  Pp. 57-133.

Objective of chapter is to provide a framework for fertility decline that combines economic and sociological theories

- Economic theory has typically taken a demand approach to fertility

- A household’s demand for children is based on balancing its subjective tastes against externally determined constraints such as price and income in a way that maximizes its satisfaction

- The “income” that factors into fertility decisions includes all of the potential income of the hh; husband’s, wife’s, and children’s earnings over the course of the parents’ life cycle

- Research indicates that preferences for number of children tend to be larger in developing countries than in developed ones

- May be due to increased material and social aspirations available to people in advanced societies

- Sociological theory has typically taken a production approach to fertility

- The number of live births is seen as a function of natural fertility and the practice and efficiency of fertility regulation

- Davis and Blake (1956) propose a series of intermediate fertility variables that determine natural fertility and fertility regulation

- Primary determinants of natural fertility include frequency of intercourse, involuntary limits on fecundity, and fetal loss due to involuntary causes

- Motivation, attitudes (social norms), and access determine the use of fertility regulation

Synthesis

- Ideally, couples want to balance the number of desired children with the number of surviving children

- It is the prospective loss of welfare associated with unwanted children that provides the motivation for regulating fertility

- However, subjective and economic costs are also associated with fertility regulation, and may outweigh the potential costs of having more children than desired

- How this model accounts for the fertility decline associated with the demographic transition

The survival of more children leads to the motivation to regulate fertility

However, at first the costs associated with fertility regulation outweigh the desire to limit fertility

- As new contraceptive methods are developed and accepted by society, the costs associated with fertility regulation decrease and people begin to have fewer children

- Other factors associated with the dem trans also affect natural and desired fertility

- For instance, better public health and medical care likely increases natural fertility, growth in education and mass media likely decreases desired fertility, per capita income growth likely increases natural fertility but decreases desired fertility, etc.

- Modernization brought fertility decisions under the realm of conscious control and thus alters the essential nature of fertility regulation

- In premodern times, fertility was regulated by social and biological mechanisms operating through natural fertility (epidemics, plagues, diseases, accidents, etc.), and wasn’t viewed as hh problem of wanted versus unwanted fertility

categorizes countries into groups representing different types of labor market, state, and family to show how fertility in social-democratic countries like Norway differs from fertility in conservative regimes like Italy

“Parity progression and birth intervals in China: The influence of policy in hastening fertility decline.” Population and Development Review, 19(1), 61-101.

Analyzes parity progression and birth interval statistics in relation to the Chinese government’s birth planning policies

Data come from China’s 1988 two-per-thousand survey

Results

- Marriage remains essentially universal in China

- Age at marriage varies somewhat by region (rural, town, city) with individuals from more urban areas marrying later

- There was actually a decline in the age at first marriage in 1979 following the introduction of the one-child policy because this policy relaxed prior restrictions on early marriage present in the later-longer-fewer policy

- Vast majority of couples have at least one birth

- In the 1970s, prior to the one-child policy, 95% of women went on to have a second birth

- With the intro of this policy in 1979, period progression ratios fell greatly, reaching a low of 62 in 1984, and rebounding to 77 in 1987

- One child policy had largest effects in the cities

- In 1978, 87% of women had second birth; in 1983, 11% had second birth!

- Close to half of women in the 1980s who had a second birth went on to have a third

- Very different picture in cities, however, where only 10% of women with a second child have a third

- Although not many women have 4 or more births, the proportion is fairly high given the strict policies in place

- 35% progress to higher order births, although most of this occurs in rural areas where policy implementation is weak

In sum, age at marriage and fertility were almost certainly influenced by policy

- Nevertheless, shouldn’t forget that fertility may have declined even in the absence of government intervention, although it’s highly unlikely the declines would have been so dramatic

- In rural areas and towns especially, where the role of societal factors was to resist decline, policy played a big role

- The results also reveal limitations of China’s population policies, including difficulty achieving policy objectives in country as a whole due to higher rates of fertility in rural areas and towns compared to cities

Empirical research by suggests substantial increases in contraceptive prevalence can be achieved in the absence of changes in the demand for children through the satisfaction of already-existing demand for fertility regulation

“The limits to low fertility: A biosocial approach.”

- Questions of concern to demographers today:

1. how low can fertility fall?

2. whether, given true choice in the matter for the first time in history, humans might cease to reproduce altogether given the high physiological, temporal, and financial costs involved in raising children for the required 20 years or so?

Foster argues that humans’ (especially women’s) “need to nurture” will prevent fertility from falling even further

- Women have a biologically based predisposition toward nurturing or maternal behavior that interacts with environmental stimuli, resulting, in most cases, in a conscious motivation for bearing at least one child

- A number of factors modify the relationship between this predisposition to nurture and the decision to have a child, including:

1) being in a relationship with a like-minded partner,

2) perceived costs of childbearing,

3) perceived benefits of childbearing,

4) financial circumstances,

5) career opportunity costs, and

6) age

“Two kinds of preindustrial household formation systems.” Population and Development Review, 8(3), 449-494.

Objective of paper is to compare 2 types of hh formation systems: simple versus joint

- Simple hh systems prevalent in preindustrial NW Europe

- Joint hh systems prevalent in preindustrial India and China

3 hh formation rules in simple hh systems

1. Late marriage for both sexes

2. After marriage, couples become head of hh

3. Before marriage, young people work lesser amounts

3 hh formation rules in joint hh systems

1. Earlier marriage for men and women

2. Newlywed couple not usually head of own hh

3. Households with many couples often split to form 2+ hhs, often still containing multiple married couples

- Hajnal uses historical census data from Denmark in the 1700s and India/China in the 1950s to provide evidence for arguments

- Despite different hh systems, average hh size very similar in NW Europe and India/China

Extra ppl are servants in Europe and relatives in India/China

- Moreover, later age at marriage in Europe means that fewer new hhs are formed, thereby increasing mean size of hhs

- The institution of service in simple hh systems helped delay marriage in times of economic strain and control population growth

- Joint hh systems lacked this mechanism

“Some data on natural fertility.” Eugenics Quarterly, 8, 81-91.

Natural fertility is fertility that exists in the absence of deliberate birth control; i.e. fertility that is not based on the number of previous children a couple has

2 difficulties with determining natural fertility

- Difficulty findings populations without birth control

- Difficulty collecting reliable data from these populations

Argues that natural fertility varies between populations due to differences in the resumption of sexual relations or reappearance of ovulation following birth of a child

- One problem with Henry’s analysis was that he only analyzed differences in stopping behavior once women had achieved desired number of children

- He overlooked starting behavior, or when women choose to begin having children

- For some reason, he believed that the age at marriage did not matter for fertility

 “On the modernity of traditional contraception: Time and the social context of fertility.” Population and Development Review, 28(2), 229-249.

Argues that social goals other than just avoiding fertility influence women’s choice of contraceptive method

- Focuses on the Beti population in South Cameroon

- Periodic abstinence is the most common method of fertility control practiced in this population—primarily among young, educated, progressive women

- 2 naïve theories about why Beti women choose this method are that these women are not strongly committed to contraception or that they are uninformed about the availability and low cost of modern contraception

- Johnson-Hanks shows that neither of these arguments hold true

- Though this might not be the most effective method, these women are strongly motivated to avoid a birth

2 main reasons why periodic abstinence is the preferred method

1. Fear of harmful side effects of modern methods

2. Successful periodic abstinence seen as honorable

- Women who engage in periodic abstinence are seen as self-disciplined, moral, and powerful (for instance, this method gives women strong negotiating power in their sexual relationships)

- Progressive family planning in Beti society focuses more on well-timed births than on total family size

8 intermediate fertility variables

1) proportion married,

2) contraception,

3) induced abortion,

4) lactational infecundability,

5) frequency of intercourse,

6) sterility,

7) spontaneous intrauterine mortality, and

8) duration of the fertile period

“Tempo-adjusted period progression measures, fertility postponement, and completed cohort fertility.”

Authors point out that the quantum-tempo distinction involves a clear counterfactual—what levels of fertility would we observe in the absence of tempo effects

- However, tempo and quantum interact;

->delays in fertility likely also imply reductions in fertility

“The emergence of lowest-low fertility in Europe during the 1990s.”  Population and Development Review.

- Objectives of paper:

investigate the emergence and persistence of lowest-low fertility in Europe,

analyze its demographic patterns and socioeconomic determinants, and

address the factors that underlie the divergence of fertility levels in Europe and developed countries more generally

- Authors define lowest-low fertility as a TFR below 1.3

- This level of fertility implies a 1.5% annual decline in fertility in a stable population with an overall mean age at birth of 30 years

- Also implies a reduction of every birth cohort by 50% and a halving of the stable population  every 45 years

- 13 countries in Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe attained lowest-low fertility in the 1990s

5 factors contributed to the emergence and persistence of lowest-low fertility

1. Tempo distortions that reduce the TFR below the associated level of cohort fertility

- However, there exists little evidence for “pure” postponement (increasing age at first birth is associated with lower completed fertility)

2. Socioeconomic changes—including increased returns to human capital and high economic uncertainty in early adulthood—that have made late childbearing a rational response for individuals/couples

- The three lowest-low fertility countries in Southern Europe also had the highest youth unemployment rates in the EU in the 1990s

- Economic uncertainty -> increasing returns to education ->further postponement of births

3. Social interaction effects that reinforce this behavioral adjustment and cause postponement transitions with large and persistent changes in the mean age at birth

- Social interactions contribute to the diffusion of postponement even beyond countries/regions with socioeconomic incentives

- Thus, it is likely that postponement will persist even if economy improves

4. Institutional settings that favor a low quantum of fertility

- Lack of institutional support for working parents

- Lack of gender equity within households

5. Postponement-quantum interactions that amplify the consequences of this institutional setting when it is combined with a rapid delay in childbearing

- The main driver of lowest-low fertility has been declines in higher parity births (most people still have one birth)

- This suggests that even in lowest-low contexts, the incentives for children are sufficiently strong to induce women to have at least one birth

Some questions that remain

- Is lowest-low fertility a permanent, long-term phenomenon or is it merely transient?

- Will fertility continue to decline beyond lowest-low levels?

- Will lowest-low fertility spread beyond Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe?

- Has the postponement of childbearing in lowest-low countries reached its limit?

Authors suggest that policies designed to increase the compatibility of work and children are the most promising for reversing trends toward lowest-low fertility

“Recent trends in fertility and household formation in the industrialized world.” Review of Population and Social Policy, 9, 121-170.

Review of explanations for the patterns characteristic of the SDT

Neoclassical microeconomic theory states that female education led to more female economic autonomy, higher costs of entry into a union, and higher opportunity costs associated with childbearing and childrearing

Easterlin’s (1976) relative deprivation theory states that consumption aspirations requires extra hh income, provided by female labor

Ideational theories point to reduced legitimacy of normative regulation and authority, increased secularism and individual ethical autonomy, and growing respect for individual choices

- However, heterogeneity in patterns of leaving home and hh formation suggest that other mechanisms need to be accounted for, such as. . .

1. Different patterns of diffusion across social strata within countries

2. Different policies and policy responses

3. Different reactions to periods of economic hardship

4.  Country or region specific cultural traits

Article analyzes the recent period changes in fertility in industrialized countries from the point of view of fertility postponement at younger ages and subsequent partial recuperation at later ages

Ways in which the US is anomalous compared to other western countries

- Teenage fertility has remained very high

- No decline in fertility at ages 20-24 or 25-29 since cohorts reaching adulthood in late 60s and early 70s

- Steady rises in fertility after age 30 and age 35

- Large differences by education (women with a college education have exhibited the postponement common of other western countries)

- Outcome is that current period fertility rates are diverging because of differential recuperation in Western countries and Japan and strong reaction to economic overhaul of Eastern Europe in 1989

- Eastern European countries mostly displaying a quantum reduction rather than a tempo effect

- One group of western countries has displayed postponement with relatively strong recuperation after age 30 (Scandinvia, GB, Fr)

- Other group has displayed postponement with very little recuperation (Italy, Spain, Begium, Germany, and Switzerland)

- End of postponement would not bring period TFRs back to replacement level unless fertility at older ages rose drastically

Household formation also becoming destandardized

- Historical context matters quite a bit for new hh patterns

- Main determinants of independent living and premarital cohabitation (as opposed to prolonged stay in the parental hh and marriage) are. . .

1. Expansion of the welfare state

2. Prolongation of education

3. Emergence of a more libertarian culture with greater tolerance for alternative lifestyles

4. Intergenerational transmission of family instability

- Not only is the actual experience of instability in the familial hh a correlate of this phenomenon, but also weaker familistic values in the parental generation

Main determinants of postponement of first marriage are. . .

- Advanced education

- Growing labor market flexibility (less secure and structured career development)

- Cycles characterized by weakened economic opportunities for new cohorts

- Unfavorable conditions (higher rents, purchase prices)

- Rising material aspiration and consumerism

- Greater distrust in the institution of marriage

- Social diffusion of alternative living arrangements

- More idiosyncratic or culture specific factors (for example, rising individual and autonomous partner choice replacing arranged marriage in Japan)

Cross-national variation in the household positions of women aged 20-24

a. Resident in parental hh

    - Very common in southern Europe (about 80%!)

b. Living alone

     - High prevalence in Northern Europe

     - High prevalence in Japan

c. Cohab without children

     - High prevalence in Western Europe

     - High prevalence in Northern Europe

d. Cohab with children

     - High prevalence in Western Europe

     - High prevalence in Northern Europe

e. Single mother

     - High prevalence in Eastern Europe

f. Married without children

g.  Married with children

     - High prevalence in Eastern Europe

 “A century of demographic and cultural change in Western Europe.” Population and Development Review, 9(3), 411-435.

- Substantial fertility decline can only occur when fertility is brought under the realm of individual control

- Decreased demand for children in Western Europe corresponded with increased humanist values and reverence for the individual

- These ideals arose first in France and the US, which is also where fertility declined first

- Furthermore, this initial decline in marital fertility occurred in the late 18^th and early 19^th century, prior to the industrial revolution of the middle and late 19^th century

Lesthaeghe also argues that the recent fertility decline of the late 1960s and 1970s stems from decreased demand for kids due to increased labor opportunities for women and decline in relative income of younger generations

- In an empirical analysis of this theory, secularization and urbanization do indeed emerge as the two main factors responsibly for decreased demand for children

- In sum, both the 1^st and 2^nd demographic transitions reflect the same long-term shift in the Western ideational system

“The second demographic transition in Western countries: An interpretation.” In Gender and Family Change in Industrialized Countries. Pp. 17-62.

3 phases of the second demographic transition

- 1^st phase (1955-1970) involved increasing prevalence of divorce, secular declines in fertility, and increasing age at marriage

- 2^nd phase (1970-1985) involved spread of premarital cohabitation from Nordic countries to the rest of the West

- 3^rd phase (1985-onward) involved a plateau in divorce rates

- Motivations for the first and second demographic transitions differed considerably

- According to Aries (1980), the first transition was motivated primarily by altruistic concerns for the wellbeing of children, whereas the second transition was motivated by increasing individualism

- Some sources of motivations underlying the second demographic transition include increased quality-related demands placed on individuals with respect to adult relationships, individual autonomy, anti-authoritarian ideology, and advanced consumerism and market orientation

- One interesting pattern of the second transition is that the changes in union formation and procreation occurred in much shorter a time period than those associated with the first transition

- Despite the apparent cohesiveness in the driving forces of the second transition, countries continue to exhibit idiosyncracies

- Furthermore, ethnic minorities within countries display heterogeneity with respect to family behavior

- Nevertheless, Lesthaeghe argues that the changes associated with the second transition are here to stay and that the probability for a return to the previous situation of family and fertility behavior is practically nil

“The unfolding story of the second demographic transition.” Population Studies Center Research Report 10-696.

- Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa were the first to articulate the theory of the ^2nd demographic transition in 1986

- Various trends have characterized the second demographic transition (SDT)

- Rising divorce rates (beginning in the 1950s)

- Falling fertility (1960s)

- Increasing proportions single

- Increase in premarital cohabitation

- Decline in remarriage following divorce and widowhood

- Procreation within cohabiting unions (1980s, Northern and Western Europe)

Present article organized in terms of various criticisms of SDT and Lesthaeghe’s responses

1. The SDT is merely a continuation of the first demographic transition (FDT)

- With regards to marriage, the FDT is characterized by rise in proportions marrying, low or reduced cohab, low divorce, and high remarriage

- The SDT is characterized by fall in proportions marrying,rise in cohab, rise in divorce, decline in remarriage

- With regards to fertility patterns, the FDY is characterized by decline in fertility at older ages, deficient contraception, declining illegit fertility, low childlessness in unions

- In contrast, the SDT characterized by postponement of parenthood, efficient contraception, rising extra-marital fertility, rising childlessness in unions

- Lesthaeghe argues that during the FDT contraception was adopted in order to avoid pregnancies; in the SDT contraception is stopped to start a pregnancy

- The pattern of cyclical fertility predicted by Easterlin (1973) in which small cohorts would have more children due to better economic opportunities never occurred; small cohorts did not increase fertility following the baby bust

- With regard to sociocultural patterns, the FDT was concerned with obtaining basic material needs, rising membership in civic and community groups, strong normative regulation by states and churches, segregated gender roles, and ordered life course transitions

- In contrast, the SDT concerned with realization of higher-order, non-material needs, disengagement from civic and community groups, retreat of the state and increased secularization, rising symmetry of gender roles, and flexible life course organization

- In sum, the one transition view fails to recognize that:

1. the FDT and SDT are differentiated and somewhat antagonistic in terms of many family formation variables,

2. that they correspond to two different historical phases, and

3. that they have very different implications for future population growth (or decline)

2. The SDT is unique to Northern and Western Europe

- In Central and Eastern Europe, many features of the SDT became apparent after the collapse of Communist regimes in 1989

- However, Lestaeghe doesn’t think trends will return to how they were once economies start doing better; values appear to have changed

- Southern Europe has also witnessed many features of the SDT

- One exception is that marriage remains the predominant precondition for procreation, although some data suggest extra-marital fertility in Italy is increasing

3. Features of the SDT appear to be progressing differently in different countries

- For instance, although delaying childbearing is a very common feature of the SDT, there exists variation in whether or not cohorts recuperate delayed births

- More evidence is needed to explain differential recuperation of fertility across countries

- One factor that may lead to increased recuperation at later ages is ease of combining work and family

4. The SDT hasn’t spread to non-Western populations

- Lesthaeghe provides evidence that this simply is not the case

 4 features that a country must exhibit to suggest that the SDT is occurring

1. Sub-replacement fertility linked to fertility postponement

2. Rising age at marriage linked to growing prominence of free partner choice and female autonomy

3. Premarital cohabitation more common and acceptable

4. Individual connections between demographic features and value orientations

- Based on these factors, the SDT appears to be occurring in Japan, South Korea, and Singapore

Finally, Lesthaeghe ends with 4 future predictions based on SDT

1. Normative and institutional props supporting traditional union formation and hh structures will continue to weaken

2. Self-realization will become a major goal in its own right

3. New technologies will spread the values and behaviors of the SDT to developing countries

4. Fundamentalist reactions will occur, but will not stem the overall shift toward “post-materialist” values

“Gender equity in theories of fertility transition.” Population and Development Review, 26(3), 427-439.

Main argument is that high levels of gender equity in individual institutions combined with low levels of gender equity in family institutions contribute to very low fertility

- This accounts for below replacement level fertility in many developed countries today

- A certain degree of gender equity within families is necessary for women to feel like they have control over their fertility decisions

- Thus, it contributes to fertility decline of the first demographic transition

- Gender equity is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for initial fertility decline

- Recently, there have been large increases in gender equity in more individual-oriented institutions (workplace, politics, education, etc.) in developed countries

- However, gender equity in families has been slower to change (gender still determines who does childcare and housework)

- Women who want to enjoy the benefits of individual institutions have no choice but to have fewer children

- Until gender equity in families matches gender equity outside of the home, fertility will likely remain very low

“Low fertility at the turn of the twenty-first century.” Annual Review of Sociology, 32, 375-399.

Overview of trends and causes of very low fertility

Trends

- Greece, Italy, and Spain have lowest TFRs at 1.25, 1.28, and 1.27 respectively

- US has highest TFR of low fertility countries (just below replacement)

Decomposing low fertility

- Shift from high fertility to low fertility regime during demographic transition mostly resulted from declining number of higher parity births

- In contrast, the second demographic transition to lowest low fertility hinges on the behavior of women with no or few births (Ryder 1980)

Age at childbearing also important

- Shift toward later mean age at first birth leads to temporary drop in TFR that will go away once mean age stops shifting

- Nevertheless, timing and quantum of births are not unrelated

- Later childbearing leaves lowers risk of unintended pregnancy, increases the risk of sub- or infecundability, and allows couples to alter (usually lower) their fertility intentions

- Some factors that may lead to birth postponement include socioeconomic incentives for women and social norms

- Some more fundamental factors influencing low fertility

- Gidden’s (1991) theory of the deinstitutionalization of the modern life course stresses how children have become optional and parenting is seen as something that should contribute to self-actualization

- McDonald stresses how disjuction between gender equity at work versus home contributes to low fertility

- Esping-Anderson (1999) categorizes countries into groups representing different types of labor market, state, and family to show how fertility in social-democratic countries like Norway differs from fertility in conservative regimes like Italy

- Goldin and Katz (2000) stress the role of the pill in changing women’s decisions regarding their career and marriage (makes it possible to invest in expensive, long-term job training without sacrificing sex or relationships)

- Future research should examine the factors influencing women’s fertility intentions and why these intentions are often not realized

“Advances in development reduce fertility declines.” Nature, 460(6), 741-743.

- More than half of the global population now lives in regions with below replacement level fertility (2.1 TFR)

- However, authors find that especially high levels of human development are associated with a rebound of fertility from very low levels

- Although the general trend in the relationship between socioeconomic conditions and fertility is negative, at some inflection point this trend reverses and becomes positive

Future research should examine how improved labor-market flexibility, social security and individual welfare, gender and economic equality, human capital and social/family policy facilitate higher fertility in developed countries

- At a high level of development, governments might turn to making economic success and family life more compatible for women in order to increase fertility

“Post-transition fertility.”

2 main conclusions of paper

1. Stabilization levels for countries now in fertility transition will be similar to those in contemporary countries with TFRs around 2.0

- This conclusion primarily based on evidence from past trends

2. In all countries, once low fertility is reached, future change is indeterminate

3 characteristics of low fertility trends

1. Best characterized as period trends, not cohort trends (all cohorts have experienced shift in fertility at the same time)

2. Trends have involved both a reduction in the total number of births and a change in the timing of births

3. Reduction of the number of births has primarily occurred at higher order births

- However, we must not forget vast differences in fertility levels among subgroups within countries

Reasons for additional decreases in low fertility countries include:

desire for self-actualization,

increased age at marriage,

increased rates of divorce,

socioeconomic depression

destabilization due to wars, and

increased opportunities for women

- To increase fertility in low-fertility countries, governments should institute policies that make it easier to combine work and family

- Tax deductions and child subsidies might have a modest effect, but the above suggestion would likely have a much larger effect

 “No babies?”  New York Times.

Describes patterns of low fertility in Europe and the US, and people’s responses to it

- Southern Europe, particularly Italy, Greece, and Spain, have the lowest fertility in the world

            - Other parts of Europe also have fertility below replacement level

- The number one reason for extremely low fertility in Southern Europe is difficulty combining work and family

            - Traditional gender roles at home combined with gender equity in the workplace

- Northern Europe has higher fertility due to its generous welfare policies for parents

- The US also has relatively high fertility, not because of generous welfare benefits, but because of its flexible job market (easier for women to leave and re-enter the job market)

- Many are concerned about demographic and economic consequences of this phenomenon

- Issues of low fertility are inherently ties to issues of immigration

- Massive flows of young immigrants would be necessary to offset these demographic problems, but few Europeans are in favor of such a policy

-Some people are not so pessimistic about falling birth rates, however

- They see smaller populations as an opportunity to better quality of life

“Economic problems of population change.” In The Evolution of Population Theory, edited by Johannes Overbeek. P. 140-152.

Discussion of the interrelationship between economics and population

- Believes that social, economic, and political difficulties will eventually check population growth either by increasing deaths or reducing births

- Begins by discussing the example of European fertility decline

- Death rates in Europe fell first while fertility rates lagged behind

- Notestein believes that this lag was due to the fact that social and economic institutions continued to value large families

- Agrarian societies rely on lots of children to help make a living

- Little value placed on individual achievement means that there is little else for adults to organize their lives around than childrearing

Mortality decline is a necessary but not sufficient conditions for fertility decline

Reasons why modern development eventually -> fertility decline

Shift toward secular individualism

   - Allows people to see fertility within the realm of conscious choice, rather than a result of the will of God

Increasing cost of children

  - This is partly due to declining value of child labor (and eventual restriction of child labor) in industrial societies

Growing importance of the individual

- In industrial societies individuals rely more on their own skills and achievements to make a living

- With this comes the increasing importance of education as a necessary tool to succeed; parents must therefore invest in their children’s education

- Better health means that individuals can develop their human capital early in life and wait longer to earn a living

- Appearance of alternatives to marriage and childrearing as a means of livelihood and prestige for women

- Increasing standard of living (which having more children depletes)

Notestein then considers whether or not fertility decline will follow a similar pattern in less developed countries

- Argues that they largely will, so long as they follow a similar path of economic development from agrarian to industrial societies

- However, because mortality rates are declining so quickly in developing countries and fertility rates tend to lag, they run the risk of huge population growth and the squalor that comes along with it

Notestein therefore argues that we should use public policy to lower birth rates in these countries

- Can try to increase age at marriage, increase birth control, reduce economic advantage of large families, and increase opportunities for women

- However, stimulating social change may cause political upheaval and deaths

- It is therefore essential to shift the values and attitude associated with childbearing too

The Effects of Infant and Child Mortality on Fertility. “Introduction.” New York, NY: Academic Press.

Aim of article is to evaluate how changes in child mortality may affect changes in fertility

- It has been theorized that a decline in child mortality is necessary for family planning to be effective because families need to bear fewer children to achieve a particular desired number of surviving children

Some mechanisms that link child mortality to fertility

Interval effect: the interval between births is elongated by breastfeeding; death of child -> less time spent breastfeeding -> smaller interval between births

Postpartum abstinence: Some cultures believe that if you get pregnant too soon after giving birth you will be stealing resources from newborn; this leads to taboo against sex after giving birth

- Particularly common in West Africa

Replacement strategy: Parents want to have x number of kids by the end of the reproductive period; if any die before end of period they try to replace them

Insurance strategy: Parents want to have x number of kids at some point in the future; they have more than x kids as a form of insurance against later deaths

Nevertheless, replacement is often incomplete because one child’s death often does not result in another child’s birth

Some reasons why replacement may be incomplete include . . .

- Couple has no target number of surviving children

- The target is so high it could not be achieved even if all children survived

- Targets are framed for one sex only

- Control of fertility is imperfect (couple may be unable to replace child even if they want to)

- Death produces a downward modification of target

- Child death was anticipated and additional children born as an insurance strategy

Some extrafamilial mechanisms that may also link mortality decline and fertility decline include decreased standard of living and/or increased migration associated with population growth

Showed that period fertility rate can change even if the cohort fertility rate remains unchanged

Showed that the increase in period fertility was due more to the timing of births than the changes in quantum

The second demographic transition to lowest low fertility hinges on the behavior of women with no or few births

(as opposed to shift from high fertility to low fertility regime during demographic transition mostly resulted from declining number of higher parity births).

“Infant mortality, social networks, and subsequent fertility.” American Sociological Review, 71, 288-309.

Objective of paper is to study how social learning about child mortality impacts individual fertility

- Thus far, very little evidence has linked macro-level trends in child mortality to individual fertility decisions

- Focuses on the small Nepalese village of Timling

- Hypothesizes that the higher child mortality is within a woman’s social network the higher her risk of childbirth will be

- Gives survey to every woman in village aged 15+ and tells them to indicate important others in their social network

- Also tracks infant mortality within a woman’s family and among others in social network

Results

- Small effect of extra-familial infant mortality on fertility, even controlling for intra-familial infant mortality

- Significant interaction of extra-familial infant mortality and variance of mortality on risk of childbearing

- Suggests that interpersonal interaction is an important source of info for women when making fertility decisions, especially when one can be relatively certain that the info is accurate (i.e. when there is low variance in infant mortality among others in social network)

“Timing effects and the interpretation of period fertility.” Demography, 41(4), 801-819.

Develops the average cohort measure (ACF) of fertility, which measures period fertility adjusted for timing effects

- Norman Ryder argued that fertility change should be analyzed from a cohort perspective

- In contrast, Bongaarts and Feeney take a period perspective with their tempo-adjusted TFR

- As a way to combine these perspectives, Schoen’s measure examines the fertility behavior of a period and assesses the extent to which that period has a disproportionate share of cohort fertility

- Develops a timing index (TI) to assess the extent to which the cohort fertility of women childbearing during year t occurs in year t

- If TI(t) =1 no timing effects are occurring

- If TI(t) < 1 year t contains disproportionately small amount of cohort fertility and

- If TI(t) >1 year t contains disproportionately large amount of cohort fertility

The average cohort fertility in year t ACF(t) = TFR(t) / TI(t)

- One major limitation of this method is that it requires knowledge of completed cohort fertility, which often isn’t available until long after women have children

- Schoen argues that the ACF performs better than Bongaarts and Feeney’s TFR* because the TFR* has the tendency to amplify some period behavior while at other times failing to capture the level and direction of fertility timing effects

TFR* performs better when there are long, gradual changes in the mean age at childbearing

 analysis showed that in nearly all countries with specified demographic fertility targets, satisfying the unmet need for contraception would obviate the need for such targets

- As a result, reducing unmet need became a target in itself rather than a means for achieving demographic goals

“Population policies, family planning programs, and fertility: The record.” Population and Development Review. 27, 184-204.

Objective of paper is to investigate the role of national family planning programs in fertility transitions

- Governments have exhibited growing support for policy interventions, specifically those related to contraceptive services

A population program is the enactment of nationally defined policies or organized strategies to affect demographic trends or patterns

- Uses a measure of family planning strength developed by Maudlin et al.

- Finds that strength of program is associated with decreases in TFR, but association not statistically significant

- Birth control use does -> decreased TFR, but we can’t necessarily attribute increased contraceptive use to family planning programs

- Based on regression models, it appears that the combination of family planning programs and US population assistance reduced TFR in developing countries by about 0.5 overall

- In the future, population policies and programs should employ evaluative studies to measure and increase their effectiveness

- These studies should focus on determining the factors influencing the efficiency of programs and then focus on issues of equitable distribution

“Europe’s fertility transition: New evidence and lessons for today’s developing world.”

Review major findings from past studies on fertility decline in Western Europe

-Most of their data comes from the European Fertility Project

4 main findings from past work

1. The past was largely characterized by natural fertility (deliberate practice of family limitation was largely absent)

- This doesn’t mean, as some have argued, that couples in pre-transition societies have little motivation to limit births

- Many of these births were likely unwanted, but couples didn’t posses the knowledge of or didn’t accepted methods of birth control

- High infant or child mortality may have been the result of unconscious efforts to eliminate unwanted children

2. The shift from high to low fertility was mostly the result of fertility limitation within marriage, and once started it was an irreversible process

3. The onset of the fertility decline took place under a wide variety of demographic and socioeconomic conditions

4. Differences in the start and speed of the fertility decline seem to have been determined more by the cultural setting than by socioeconomic conditions

- For example, French-speaking regions of Belgium underwent the decline together, while Flemish-speaking regions lagged behind

- Main argument of paper is that the diffusion of the idea of family limitation was an essential component of the fertility transition

- Finally, authors list implications for limiting growth in today’s developing countries

“Conclusions.” In The Decline of Fertility in Europe.  Edited by Ansley J. Coale and Susan Cotts Watkins.  Guildford, Surrey: Princeton University Press.  Ch. 11.

The two goals of the European Fertility Project were:

1. to create a quantitative record of fertility in each of the several hundred provinces in Europe during the period of major decline and

2. to determine the social and economic conditions that led to this decline

- Because demographic transition theory is supposed to predict future patterns in developing countries, the project also wanted to examine whether or not these patterns held in all or most of Europe

- Watkins distinguishes between nuptiality and marital fertility when describing declines in fertility

- Creates and index of marital fertility I_g and an index of nuptiality I_m  to compare rates of fertility and nuptiality to the Hutterite population in the United States (population with highest observed levels of fertility)

Summary of major findings from the European Fertility Project

- Original fertility rates lower than originally believed

- Large fluctuations in pre-transition fertility (primarily driven by fluctuations in nuptiality)

- Decreases in fertility rates during the transition mostly due to decreases in marital fertility

Some major explanations for fertility decline

- Decreases in infant and child mortality, increased urbanization, changing roles of women, increased education

- However, evidence for these explanations was surprisingly weak

- Watkins argues that local norms were the primary drivers to fertility decline

- Many of the researchers on the European Fertility Project found that clusters of provinces went through the transition together, even though some of the provinces had not yet experienced modernization

- This was especially true of provinces that shared a language, culture, etc.

- Stark similarities in nuptiality and marital fertility rates in geographically and culturally similar provinces

- Thus, certain economic and social conditions may have been necessary for fertility rates to begin to fall in some provinces, but once this decline in fertility rates started, it quickly spread to nearby provinces even if they hadn’t experienced these social and economic changes

“Europe’s Second Demographic Transition.”

- This article was the first to push for using the term “second demographic transition” to explain the changes in fertility and family life that were occurring in developed countries

- Whereas the first demographic transition was altruistic in nature (motivated by improving quality of life for children) the second demographic transition is more individualistic (driven by the rights and self-fulfillment of individuals)

4 shifts characterize the 2^nd demographic transition

1. Shift from the golden age of marriage to the dawn of cohabitation

2. Shift from the era of the king-child with parents to the king-pair with child

3. Shift from preventative contraception to self-fulfilling contraception

4. Shift from uniform to pluralistic families and households

Patterns of marriage, divorce, and cohabitation

- In the 1970s, the idea of cohabitation as a “trial marriage” was largely replaced by the idea of cohabitation as an alternative to marriage

Patterns of fertility

- 3^rd and higher order births have dropped dramatically in developed countries since 1965

- Increase in out-of-wedlock births, particularly among older women

Patterns of contraception

- USSR was the first country to legalize abortion in 1920

- In Eastern Europe, abortion quite common (van da Kaa calculates that women in these countries have an average of 1 to 2.5 legal abortions in their lifetimes, compared to 0.2 to 0.6 elsewhere in Europe)

Patterns of living arrangements

- Divergence of “acceptable” household structure

3 areas of concern among pronatalists

1. Continuation of national populations

2. Continuation of cultural identity and world power

3. Future of the welfare state

- Although pronatalists policies (such as tax deductions or child subsidies) might be modestly effective, it is difficult to imagine them overcoming individualist desires and raising fertility to above replacement level