Term
| waltz's argument on proliferation |
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Definition
-“more may be better” Gradual Spread. Acquisition of nuclear weapons should come in a slow, gradual process- in pairs of “enemies” or aggressors in order to cancel each other out (India & Pakistan) -believed that gradual nuclear proliferation will lead to a more peaceful world, structural realism; international system=anarchy, each state responsible for its own security and self interest, like a free market economy; nuclear weapons have a sobering effect, and crystal ball effect (everyone knows what will happen in nuclear war) this causes states to not go to war -Second strike forces over defensive forces -Structural Realist- international system in the way that states behave -The world should be an Anarchy in a sense- no central power to resolve all problems -Main Conclusions: 1. International Politics is a self-help system -allowed to attain its own security
2. Nuclear Weapons make miscalculations difficult-nuclear war provides certain results if waged (conventional=win or lose) 3. New Nuclear States will fell constraints -nuclear weapons make wars hard to start -leaders of nuclear states sober up in the face of nuclear weapons -Radical leaders-radical internally, not externally |
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Term
| sagan's argument on proliferation |
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Definition
-“more will be worse” Organizational Behavior. -proliferation is bad, due to organizational uncertainty, lack of security on nukes, fog of war (best laid plans often go awry) standard operating procedures (people will follow them blindly) -States are made up of Organizations-Professional Military organizations with inflexible routines that display organizational behaviors that are likely to lead to deterrence failures and deliberate or accidental war -“more may be our fate but not our goal” -Main Conclusions: 1. Organizational Behavior
-Standard Operating Procedures and Organizations are bounded by rules, bureaucratic chain of command 2. Preventative or Pre-emptive Strikes=military leaders have control over final decision -military leaders minimize diplomatic consideration and believe war is inevitable -lack of civilian control or oversight -Pessimistic view or rationality of states 3. Learning Occurs after Failures -Organizational procedures do not change until it is too late -Must have invulnerable second strike nuclear forces -Reference Dr. Strangelove= Problems with Nuclear Weapons malfunctions/organizations |
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Term
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Definition
-In nuclear strategy, 1st strike capability is a country’s ability to defeat another nuclear power by destroying its arsenal to the point where the attacking country can survive the weakened retaliation. -SAGAN=military organizations or leaders tend to favor preventative and preemptive strikes, therefore, must have invulnerable second strike forces. |
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Term
| dr. strangelove plot and links to nuclear doctrine |
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Definition
-Satirical movie playing off Cold War tensions and fears of nuclear disasters with the problems of organizational procedures -Air Force general goes nuts (soviet floridation of drinking water) issues nuclear strike; president and advisors try to bring them back, attack base, get codes, all except one plane recalled, doomsday device, everyone dies, mineshaft gap. links to nuclear doctrine: MAD, organizational criticism-one unhinged man has the capability to launch a nuclear strike due to his superseding his authority by claiming the president is dead, criticism of unforeseen events -slim pickens plane isn’t shot down and goes to another target -Plot- Insane US Air Force General who orders a first strike nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union, while the president of the US and Joint Chiefs try to recall the bombers to prevent a nuclear apocalypse -Themes -Organizational Problems -Institution of “Plan R” – has a million different steps to implementing the plan. -This shows the prearranged planning and the following of strict orders within military organizations -President and Joint Chiefs unable to recall orders because a step in the plan calls for the disconnecting of all communications -Possible mistake when a country thinks it is being attacked -Theory of Mutually Assured Destruction -where each side is supposed to take comfort in the fact that a nuclear war would be a cataclysmic disaster |
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Term
| reagan's approach to containment |
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Definition
1. Harsh Rhetoric-Overt Criticism 2. Willingness to negotiate 3. Massive Arms Buildup -Strategic Defense Initiative -Idea of Roll Back -Not just contain the Soviets but roll them back and END communism -Some factors that play into the Roll Back idea that make it possible 1. Gorbachev- he is not a radical, and communism wasn’t working for the Soviet Union 2. Internal Structural Problems -Externally overextended 3. Social movements -Reagan rejected Détente -He was never afraid of the Soviet Union -Built up defense expenditures (38 million an hour) -U.S.S.R. could not sustain an arms race -Reagan wanted to win the Cold War which met: The Soviet Union Not Existing -Demonstrations in the U.S. rose up to stop building Atomic bomb -Reagan believe in Armageddon: Revelations -Soviets compared Reagan to Hitler |
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Term
| arguments among bush 41 advisors on ending the gulf war |
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Definition
- To continue would exceed US mandate, figured Saddam was weak and would fall, may lose support of international community -Paul Wolfowitz -argued the threat of nuclear weapons in the Middle East threatens U.S. vital interests=Oil -Continue on and remove Saddam Hussein from power -Colin Powell -Powell Doctrine-implement a clear exit strategy while the U.S. can still choose to do it on their own terms. (exit while ahead of the game) -The plan to continue on to remove Saddam Hussein from power was not in the original war plans and having clear objectives was part of the Powell Doctrine -Powell favored keeping Saddam’s forces in power because they were the most capable of standing up to a threat from Iran in the region
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Term
| Dubya and premptive action doctrine |
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Definition
-“we must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge” - goes against 50 years of foreign policy (goes against containment, NSC-68, MAD, years of rhetoric) -Destroy powers before they have a chance to strike -If there is a real threat, it doesn’t make any sense to wait (WMD) -The risk is that you have to make sure that you have all of the facts straight -The U.S. would be willing to start a war if it thought it was going to be attacked or if it was threatened -U.S. would no longer rely on Strategies of Containment and Deterrence to prevent war from breaking out -Redefined the United Nations Charter: that a nation should go to war only in self defense -Attempted to establish the U.S. as the chief judge and enforcer of international stability -In response to other nations using preemptive strikes -“Axis of Evil”- Iraq, Iran, North Korea -Examples -Naval Quarantine during Cuban Missile Crisis -Condemned Israel for its preemptive attack on Iraq’s nuclear facilities -Current Iraq War -Reasons why Iraq appears to be viable to attack 1. WMD 2. People being denied basic necessities 3. Saddam may have ties with al Qaeda (may sell nuclear weapons to them) [SADDAM IS A SOCIALIST; HE DOESN’T CARE FOR ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST. THE ONLY THING THEY HAVE IN COMMON IS THAT THEY HATE THE U.S.] |
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Term
| neocon perspective on detente |
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Definition
| Avoid any compromise or accommodation with morally objectionable regimes, and rely instead on American military power. U.S. maintain unipolar status |
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Term
| neocon perspective on role of US military power |
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Definition
military forces capable of defending American interests around the world -having a strong military is paramount |
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Term
| neocon perspective on spread democracy as part of US foreign policy |
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Definition
| Promoting U.S. values, Democracy and Human Rights |
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Term
| neocon perspective on unilateralism vs. multilateralism |
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Definition
Skeptical of reintroduction of international law, reorganization of multilateral alliances -do not want to get tied down in alliances, international organizations, bureaucratic processes -firm approach following 9/11 – either your with us or against us mentality, not really looking to put up with the bureaucratic processes and potential discrepancies that may exist at the time between countries. |
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Term
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Definition
| 1. Group Cohesion 2. Faulty Organizational Structure: -Group Insulation -Leader Bias -Lack of Methodical Procedure -Social & Ideological Homogeneity 3. Provocative Situation: Internal or External Threat b. Symptoms of Groupthink: 1. Overestimation of Group: -Illusion of Invulnerability -Belief in Groups Inherent Morality 2. Closed-Mindedness -Collective Rationalizations -Stereotypes of Group 3. Pressures Toward Conformity -Self-Censorship -Illusion of Invulnerability -Direct pressure on Dissenters -Mindguarding c. Symptoms of defective decision-making: 1. Incomplete Survey of Alternatives 2. Incomplete Survey of Objectives 3. Failure to Examine Risks of Preferred Option 4. Failure to Reappraise Initially Rejected Options 5. Poor Information Search 6. Selective Bias in Procession Information at Hand |
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Term
| use of intel by policymakers in build up to Iraq invasion |
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Definition
-After 9/11 the U.S. would rather take a far-fetched threat (Iraq possessing WMD) more seriously due to the perceived far-fetched threat that was ignored resulting in 9/11 -A lot of military commanders from the Gulf War were still in the military so maybe they thought there was unfinished business in Iraq -We believed that there was a link between Iraq and Al Qaeda, even though there was not |
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Term
| "where you stand depends on where you sit" |
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Definition
-Your opinion is formed depending on which department you are seated in
-Indicated segregation of opinion |
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Term
| problems associated with with the pre war containment strategy on Iraq |
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Definition
-Series of limited steps that Saddam's people were able to finds ways to live with
-Gave Bin Laden recruiting help
-No Fly zone
-Did nothing for the people of Iraz
-Lack of Intel
-Didn't remove Saddam from power
-Guard still intact
-No support for US instigated uprisings |
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Term
| Rumsfeld's personality and decisionmaking style as SecDef |
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Definition
-Personality -Great Management Skills- from federal government to business sector -Strong-willed- knew when to push opinion’s/ideas and when not too -Out-spoken and Confrontational- led to many opposing his idea’s, voicing grievances over him -ex. –believe in increasing defense spending, which was in opposition to president -skillful spokesman, spontaneous, and self-confident w/everything he said -Relationship to George Bush -Acted as the decision-maker of the administration, more powerful than president -became spokesman for Afghanistan and Iraq wars, Bush in background taking advice -Iraq -Rumsfeld Doctrine- seeks to increase force readiness and decrease the amount of supply required to maintain forces by reducing number in theater. -Criticized during Iraq War when unable to combat looting & freed Iraqi’s 1. Reliance on new technological weapons 2. Air Force-main military actor 3. Limited ground forces w/limited supplies to finish invasion -Over-Confidence in U.S. war making capabilities: 1. Said didn’t need British for Iraq-Upset Tony Blair 2. Failed to admit presence of Guerilla War in Iraq -Rumsfeld Decision Making Style -Ricks said Rumsfeld had a fixed preconceived idea of what he wanted to do about Iraq. All of the intelligence and into he used was tailored to fit this idea |
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Term
| problems associated with US occupation of Iraq |
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Definition
1. Lack of Troops 2. Lack of knowledge 3. Expectiations vs. realities -Insurgencies
-Short troop rotations
-Disbanned Iraqi army
-Abu Ghirab scandal |
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Term
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Definition
-In nuclear strategy, 2nd strike capability is a country’s assured ability to respond to a nuclear attack with powerful nuclear retaliation against the attacker. -To have such an ability (and to convince the opponent of its viability) is considered extremely vital in nuclear deterrence, as otherwise the other side might be tempted to try and win a nuclear war in one massive first strike against the opponents nuclear forces. -Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) strategy when both sides have 2nd strike capability. -SAGAN=must have invulnerable second strike forces. -WALTZ=build up second strike forces rather than defensive in order to retaliate against first strike attacks. |
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