Article XII

Section 1: Restriction 

Section 2: Acquisition 

Section 3: Interests

Section 4: NMD defined (100% or degree) 

Proving NMD 

Section 5: NMD Corp

Section 6: Violation of XII

Sec1: acquisition of permanent and long-term interests in real property shall be restricted to persons of NMD.

Sec2: “Acquisition” includes sale, lease, gift, inheritance. A transfer to a spouse by inheritance is not an acquisition if owner dies without issue or with issue not eligible to own land. A transfer to a mortgagee by means of a foreclosure on a mortgage is not an acquisition under this section if the mortgagee is a full service bank, Federal Agency or Governmental entity of the Commonwealth and does not hold the permanent or long-term interest in real property for more than ten years beyond the term of the mortgage.

Sec3. Permanent and long-term: freehold & leasehold interests of more than 55 yrs including renewal rights, except an interest acquired above the first floor of a condominium building. Any interests acquired above the first floor of a condominium building is restricted to private lands. Any land transaction in violation of this provision shall be void. This amendment does not apply to existing leasehold agreements.

Sec4. NMD=United States citizen/national + degree of Chamorro or Carolinian blood or both. For purposes of determining Adoptees not NMD if no blood. Full blood: if that person was born or domiciled by 1950 + citizen of the TTP before the termination of the Trusteeship. If less than ¼ blood, must prove by preponderance of evidence at court. Superior Court can grant or deny. “de novo” review. If some degree, shall certify.

Sec5. NMD Corporation 100% board, shareholder, incorporated + principal place in NMI. No proxy or trust by non-NMD.

Sect6. Any transaction made in violation of Section 1 shall be void ab initio. If Corp no longer NMD, Corp’s permanent or long-term interest in land shall be forfeited without right of redemption to the government.The Registrar of Corporation shall issue regulations to ensure compliance and the legislature may enact enforcement laws and procedures.

Aldan et al. v. Pangelinan et al

Facts: Appellant children filed suit against appellees, a tenant and an original lessee, to quiet title to property. The children challenged a decision of the trial court, which dismissed the tenant from suit for failure to state a claim under Civ P. 12(b)(6).

Issue: Whether court's failure to appoint a guardian ad litem renders a judgment void and whether SOL for recovery of land applies in claims voiding judgment 

R: Voidable judgment has no legal effect. Voidable J is valid until annulled.

R: When court grants divorce, it has continuing JX to make orders on child custody and support.

R:NMI R. Civ. R. 17(c) states Ct shall appoint guardian ad litem for minor/incompetent or make order to protect them or make judicial determination justifying its order 

R: Failure to join does not render J void but voidable. General presumption exists that court protects the rights of minors and when it fails to appoint, it is up to minor to demonstrate that he or she has been prejudiced by that failure to overturn an otherwise valid judgment. Failure to appoint is not a jurisdictional defect.

R: Collateral attack on judgment is an attack in a proceeding rather than a direct appeal.

R: divorce court cannot establish trust absent statutory authority.

R: Bona fide purchaser w/o notice of trust property prevails over minor trust benficiaries.

R:  Voidable judgment cannot be attacked collaterally

R:  In suits seeking to recover land by overturning a judgment, the statute of limitations period governing the recovery of land is N/A, but instead the period for challenging judgments controls.

Holding: Because plaintiff's claim (failure to appoint guardian ad litem) is a collateral attack on a voidable judgment, his claim fails. Because plaintiff's claim is not for recovery of land, it is barred by the catch-all 6 yr SOL. 

Atalig v Mobile, 2013 MP 10

Facts: Plaintiffs complain of environmental pollution by D Mobile.

Issue: whether P have standing

R: Plaintiff have standing if there is injury-in-fact (actual or threat of injury), causation (fairy traceable to harm), and redressability (redressed by favorable decision).

Holding: Yes, although there is no particularized showing of harm, reasonable inference of specific harm can be determine as well as causation (injury from pollutant from Mobile) and redressability.

Issue: whether claim survives under Rule 12(b)(6) - claim 1: constitutional right to healthy environment, claim 2:  negligence per se, claim 3: gross negligence

claim 4: strict liability  

claim 5: nuisance

claim 6: battery 

Claim 1:

R: state action: (1) the state’s coercive power has compelled an entity to act; (2) the state has delegated a public function to the entity; or (3) the state has provided “‘significant encouragement’” to the entity, the entity is a “‘willful participant in joint activity with the [s]tate,’” or the entity’s functions are “‘entwined’” with state policie

Holding: claim 1 fails, because P failed to show Mobile is a state-action. 

Claim 2-3: 

R: Negligence per se - is based on statute

R: Gross negligence - aggravated negligence (malicious intent)

Holding: claim 2 fails because no statute is violated and P failed to show Mobile is held to a heightened standard of care 

Claim 4:

R: strict liability (1) the activity creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm even when reasonable care is exercised by all actors; and (2) the activity is not one of common usage

Holding: Claim 3 fails, elements 1 & 2 not satisfied 

Claim 5: Nuisance 

R: Unreasonable interference w/ right common to general public, p must have suffered a special injury

Holding: Claim 4 fails, no special injury 

Claim 6: Battery

R: P cause harmful or offensive contact

Holding: As a matter of law, P cannot bring a battery claim on basis of pollution 

Bank of Guam v Mendiola, 2007 MP 1  

Facts: D purported owners challenged a decision from a superior court in NMI, which granted summary judgment to plaintiff bank on cc for intentional & negligent infliction of emotional distress, denied a motion for reconsideration of these claims, and granted two motions in limine. The bank filed motion to dismiss the appeal and a motion for sanctions.

Issue: Whether order granting partial summary judgment under Rule 54(b) is a final order 

R: Supreme Court has jurisdiction over final judgments and orders and other orders specifically permitted by statute including collateral order and certain interlocutory order including Rule 54(b).

R: A final judgment is one that “‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.’”

R: Rule 54 provides exception to the final judgment doctrine for cases with multiple parties or multiple claims. Court may exercise appellate jurisdiction over a Rule 54(b) partial final judgment, the separate entry of judgment must expressly state that the trial court has considered Rule 54(b) and it finds that: 1) the judgment is final as to the parties and/or the issue(s) involved; and 2) the judgment is one that warrants immediate appealability pursuant to Com. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

Holding: Because the order did not clearly indicate the judgment is final as to the parties and/or the issue(s) involved; and 2) the judgment is one that warrants immediate appealability, the order was not final order and thus subject to dismissal. 

Bank of Saipan v Connel, 2001 MP 1

Facts: P appeals trial court's motion to dismiss complaint arguing Ct lack JX over a non-resident 

Issue: Whether writ is proper (Know the Tenorio factors) 

R: (1) The party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as direct appeal, to attain the relief desired. (2) The petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal (cost is insufficient). (3) The lower court’s order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law. [p. 6] (4) The lower court’s order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a persistent disregard of applicable rules. (5) The lower court’s order raises new and important problems, or issues of law of first impression.

Issue: whether the CNMI courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant

R: CNMI long arm statute provides courts may exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident when cause of action arise from business transaction w/n Commonwealth, causing tortious injury or damage w/n Commonwealth by act or omission done outside C by person engaged in business or other acts having impact w/n C.

R: Person may be liable for her own conduct or of agent 

R: JX must comport with due process (minimum contact + not offend traditional notions of fair play and sub justice) 

R: D must have been fairly warned she may be subject to JX & foreseeability is an important factor 

R: Fair warning = D purposefully directed her activities at residents of forum and litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities

R: Foreseeability is crucial, that D's conduct and connection w/ state are such that he could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.

R: court may exercise over non-resident if activities are substantial, or continuous and systematic and sufficient relationship exists between D and state to support JX even if cause of action is unrelated to D's forum activities(general JX). If D's activities are not so pervasive, court must determine whether 1) P purposely availed of privilege of conducting activities, 2) claim arise out of D's forum related activities and 3) exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable (specific JX)

Ct also consider conflicting interests including D's burden of defending, C's interest adjudicating dispute, P's interest in obtaining convenient forum. 

R: states have important interest in providing a forum in which their residents can seek redress for injuries caused by out of state actors 

Holding: No general JX but special JX. Connell's firm actively advertised her services, purposely interjected herself by soliciting clients, providing services in Hillblom probate.

Commonwealth v. Diaz, 2013 MP 20 

Facts: D challenges his SAM conviction 

Issue: whether there is sufficient evidence to show teacher was in position of authority in relation to victim 

R: person 18 yrs old is prohibited from having sex w/ person who is 17 or 17 and at least 3 years younger and offender is in a position of authority 

R: Statute is given plain meaning. If meaning not clear, legislative intent.

R: Whether D occupied position of authority in relation to victim hinges on whether reasonable adolescent would have believed D occupied position had coercive power over her.

Holding: Because of the lopsided power dynamic between teacher and student give rise to inherent coercion, Court find teacher was in position of authority.

Issue: whether his federal constitutional right to jury trial was violated 

R: jury trial is not a fundamental right to unincorporated territories 

R: extraterritoriality of a constitutional provision turns on whether application of provision would be "impracticable & anomalous" 

Holding: Commonwealth which include a historical tradition of eschewing jury trials for less serious felonies and misdemeanors show us that applying such right would be impractical and anomalous. Plus jury trial is not fundamental right. Accordingly, no constitutional violation.

Commonwealth v. Jin Xin Xiao, 2013 MP 12  

Facts: D convicted of trafficking illegal substance 

Issue: whether prosecutor's opening and closing remarks constitute prosecutorial misconduct

R: whether improper comments infected trial w/ unfairness to make resulting conviction a denial of due process

R: whether comments inflamed juries' passion and fears

R: prosecutorial misconduct must be of sufficient significance to result in denial of D's right to a fair trial 

R: courts look at the entire trial including comment, context of remark, and strength of evidence 

Holding: duty to protect community is an improper remark but based on the court's instruction that attorney's statements are not evidence, context of remark, and strength of evidence, D was not prejudiced 

issue: whether D has a constitutional right to an expert

R: yes under 6th amendment but D must show expert would be assistance to defense and denial would lead to a fundamentally unfair trial. Underdeveloped assertions of generalized statements claiming benefit will not pass muster.

Holding: D asserted generalized statements only thus no error. 

issue: whether trial court abused its discretion by improperly allowing detective to give his opinion regarding Xiao's mental state

R: Rule of Ev prohibit testimony, directly or indirectly, as to whether D possessed a particular mental state 

Holding: Because detective did not ask whether D purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently participated in transaction, his response did not violate 704(b)

Just know the rules on motion for continuance

1) movant's diligence (whether he acted attentively and persistently) in his efforts to ready his defense prior to hearing on matter 2) likelihood that continuance would have satisfied the need for one 3) extent a continuance would have inconvenienced court and opposing party and 4) extent movant might have suffered harm due to denial + prejudiced by denial 

Commonwealth v. Quitano, 2014 MP 5  

Facts: 

Issue: whether court erred by not defining premeditation in jury instruction of first murder 

R: court must define word if it's term of art. premeditation is a term of arm. legal definition states premeditation can be formed nearly instantaneously or require a period of reflection. laymen definition means has planning component 

R: time of review rule states error must be clear when appellate court review for error rather than when trial court made the allegedly erroneous decision 

R: appellate court review sufficiency of evidence allegation under highly deferential standard. court does not reweigh conflicting evidence or credibility of witness. Rather, it considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the govt and then determines whether any reasonable trier of fact could have found the essential elements of crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Holding: there was sufficient evidence to convict D of attempted murder because laymen def of premeditation is less demanding than legal 

issue: whether conviction of both assault and battery and aggravated assault and battery and theft and armed robbery violated D's rights against double jeopardy 

R: double jeopardy protects individual from prosecution of the same offense after acquittal or conviction or multiple punishment for the same offense

R: if legislature intended multiple punishment, question ends here but if not, court must utilize Blockburger test

R: determine whether lesser included offense is part of the greater offense 

Holding: convictions of both offenses violated D's right against double jeopardy 

Commonwealth v. Sanches, 2014 MP 3 

Facts: SAM case 

Issue: whether court erred when it instructed jury that D can be found guilty if jury finds that crime occurred at a date reasonably near the date alleged 

R: first degree, offender must be at least 18 and minor 16. second degree offender at 16 or older and minor 13, 14, or 15 and at least 3 years younger. 

R: Reversal appropriate when jury instructions fail to include essential elements of offense

R: Statute is given plain meaning. If statute is capable of more than one meaning, it is deemed ambiguous. If so, court examines statute as as whole to see legislature's intent and avoid readings statute that defies common sense

R: court turns to common law if written, local customary law or restatements are silent 

R: common and approved usage of term "age" means one turns a given age on the anniversary of birth

R: For 1st and 2nd degree, exact time is essential element

Holding: Because the court instructed jury that D can be found guilty if crime occurred at a date reasonably near the date alleged, court erred and error was prejudicial.

Commonwealth v Santos, 2013 MP 10 

issue: whether ct appointed counsel may withdraw from representation  if counsel believes appeal is frivolous & if so, what procedures must counsel follow 

holding: counsel may but only in guilty plea in Commonwealth. the procedure is: 

1) counsel must diligently examine record and research law

2) if counsel does not find any non-frivolous argument, counsel must submit motion to with draw

3) motion to withdraw must be accompanied by brief discussing plea colloquy including adverse rulings and irregularities + best arguments for D + explaining why those arguments are nonetheless frivolous

4) briefing schedule will be stayed and D will be given time to respond (30 days)

5) after D responds, court will conduct independent examination of record 

6) if there is a colorable claim, motion will be denied and order supplemental briefing 

Friends of Marpi v. Commonwealth, 2012 MP 9 

Issue: whether court has JX to review preliminary injunction

R: Final Judgment Rule, Article 4, section 3, Supreme Court has JX over final orders and judgments or orders expressly permitted by statute, rule, constitutional provisions or other recognized common law doctrine

Exceptions to FJR: 

1) Probate 2) Rule 54(b) when there is multiple parties, multiple claims. Superior Court must certify order as final with express language that order is immediately appealable and enter a judgment 3) under collateral order doctrine, order which is collateral to principal litigation can be appealed if it does not affect the underlying merits of case, if issue is adjudicated, and can't be reviewed on appeal 

R: Prelim injunction factor: likelihood of success on merits, irreparable injury, balance of harm, public interest 

Holding: prelim injunction is interlocutory order and Ct has no JX to hear 

Fusco et al. v. Matsumoto, 2011 MP 17 

Facts: Appellants sister one two and lessee challenged a decision of Superior Court which denied their claims of fraud and quiet title against appellee brother, held lessee was entitled to fees and costs from brother and was entitled to damages, but none were awarded, and ruled that sister one's deed transferred her property to the brother. The brother filed a cross-appeal.

Issue: whether deed was valid 

R: grantor may make present conveyance of real property reserving life estate in grantor and conveying remainder interest to grantee

R: valid intervivos transfer requires 1) donative intent 2) delivery 3) acceptance

R: delivery may be actual or constructive. Constructive deed occurs when deed delivered to 3rd party demonstrating irrevocable intention to transfer interest to grantee 

Holding: deed valid because facts show irrevocable intent to transfer title and no evidence to indicate grantor had intent to transfer interest by subsequent deed 

issue: whether D is liable for attorney fees and damages under relevant clause of Ground Lease when he obtained fee title to Disputed ROWs under quitclaim deed 

R: one who enters into a quitclaim steps into the shoes of the transferor. this creates privity of estate between D and transferee.

R: D is bound if the clauses are real vs personal covenants.

R: Real covenants run with the land and pass by operation of law to successors in interest of land while personal covenants bind only the parties to the agreement giving rise to covenants and are not enforceable against a successor in interest. 

R: test whether clauses are real or personal: 1) promise creates burden that touches and concerns land 2) promisor and promisee intend burden is to run with transferred intent 3) transferee is not relieved of obligation by person entitled to enforce; and 4) transfer brings transferee into privity of estate with person entitled to enforce 

Holding: eminent domain clause touch and concern the leasehold property and P is entitled to compensation 

issue: whether there is no cause of action for fraud based upon a misrepresentation for future intention 

R: one who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention, or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or refrain from acting in reliance thereupon is liable for loss caused by justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation. 

R: Fraud cannot be predicated on statements which are promissory in their nature, but a promise made w/o present intent to fulfill promise is actionable as fraud 

In re Admission of Nisperos, 2007 MP 33

R: any person practicing law in Commonwealth w/o being admitted to practice is subject to discipline. discipline may consist of disbarment, suspension, public censure, private reprimand and/or any other sanction that is deemed appropriate 

R: Court has inherent authority to impose sanctions not addressed by rule. Purpose of suspension is not to punish counsel but to protect administration of justice, maintain dignity of courts and integrity of profession and protect public. 

R: Notice & opportunity to respond must be given before sanctions are imposed to comply with due process

R: To determine appropriate sanction, we consider nature of conduct, cumulative weight of violations, and harm to public and profession 

In re Estate of Antonia M. Iglecias, CV05-0141

Facts: Probate case where pineksai claimed ownership in her grandmother's HOUSE based on partida 

R: whether a child/pineksai is customarily adopted under pokasai is a question of fact 

R: There are different types of poksai, some as raising pineksai as a natural and legitimate child and some in other way

R: Probate Code recognize partida (for distribution of land - divided at each generation, but not family home)

R: Chamorro custom allows oral conveyance but it revocable

R: Chamorro custom: house should be inherited by child who has lived the longest w/ parents in their old age and cared for them most 

R: Commonwealth Code treats customarily adopted children as the "children" of their adoptive parent for purposes of intestate succession 

Holding: Because oral conveyance of home was revoked and because petitioner did not reside with grantors throughout old age and death, no right to inherit family home.

In re Estate of Rios, 2008 MP 5

Facts: appellee, decedent's grandson fighting to receive land from decedent's adopted daughter by poksai. appellee claim laches, SOL, & probate code

R: Laches: neglect or delay in bringing suit to remedy an alleged wrong, which taken together w/ lapse of time and other circumstances, causing prejudice to adverse party & operates as equitable bar 

R: D must prove: inexcusable delay in assertion of known right & 2) party asserting laches was prejudiced 

R: inexcusable delay may occur only after P discovers or with reasonable diligence could have discovered facts giving rise to cause of action 

R: Probate code does not require alleged heirs to come forward w/ their inheritance claim until hearing on the determination of decedent's heirs

R: SOL for recovery of land is 20 years: determining ownership rights is not recovery of land claim: no SOL on probate 

R: Probate Code became effective 1984. If PC does not apply, we look to TTC but TTC only addresses wills not intestate succession but mandates customary law shall have full force and effect of law. 

R: Poksai: raising or nurturing of child by an adult other than child's biological parents

R: Pineksai - child nurtured under poksai 

R: Heir: parental lineage must be determined

R: Chamorro custom: family land holdings divided at each successive generation 

R: Adopted children by custom inherit their adoptive parent's estate as would parent's natural child or issue 

Holding: Laches inapplicable and court erred in barring pinkesai's claim of inheritance; PC does not require heirs to come forward w/ inheritance until proceeding on determining heirs, PC, court is not barred from subsequently adjudicating decedent's rightful heirs, and pineksai, as decedent's sole heir, is entitled to take property 

In re Rhodes, 2002 MP 2 

Fact: attorney lied about his felony record and student loan default

Issue: whether attorney should be prohibited from practicing in the Commonwealth

R: Attorney may work for CNMI govt w/o license for 4 yrs. But one must be of good moral character and not convicted felony. 

R: Applicant in connection to bar admission application shall not knowingly make false statement of material fact

R: NMI Disc R. P. allows for cumulative sanctions. 

R: Sanction does not exist to punish the atty but to guard the administration of justice, protect the integrity of the profession and dignity of courts 

R: In fashioning appropriate remedy, the Court will look to the nature of misconduct, weight of cumulative violation, and harm to public 

Holding: Atty disbarred and admission permanently revoked. Ordered to pay sanctions.

In re Estate of Camacho, 2012 MP 8 

Facts: After reopening probate and filing a quiet title action, one of the D paid estate money pursuant to settlement agreement. Trial court found brother who refused to take part in proceedings was entitled to an equal share of estate and ordered appellant to release 1/4 from settlement. Administrator appealed.

R: Property of persons who die before 1984 is subject to TTC and other applicable law. No procedural or substantive law exists for intestate succession, thus customary law, or in the absence of customary law, common law is applicable. 

R: Since TTC, decedent's land is passed per stripes- to heirs in equal shares.

R: Devisee under will may renounce or disclaim his right but that option is not available for heir who takes by intestacy because assent is not necessary.

R: Heir may lose title by prescription, adverse possession, estoppel, gift, K, conveyance, intestacy, testamentary disposition but not by renunciation 

R: Probate court is court of general jurisdiction and has broadest possible authority to entertain any relevant matters that comes before probate 

R: PC are liberally construed and applied to promote speedy and efficient system for liquidating the estate of decedent & making distribution to successors 

R: PC modeled after UPC, absent contrary legislative intent, UPC reasoning is given effect

R: Court may exercise equity but not in violation of law

R: There are no equitable principles that overrides per stirpes thus hotchpot is not applicable 

In re Estate of Malite, 2011 MP 4

Facts: Appellants, heirs of great-grandfather's estate, sought review of order from trial court, which held appellee grandson was an heir to his grandmother's estate

R: mwei-mwei is Carolinian customary method of adopting children. Adoption takes place between relatives, initiated by women and normally a married couple, as opposed to single person, adopt the child. Customarily, the adopting parents propose to adopt a child and the natural parents must give their consent. Once child is adopted, he is treated as a natural child of the adoptive parent. 

R: Non-exclusive factor includes age of adoption, whether adoption occurs between relatives, whether adoption is initiated by women, whether adopting parent is married and whether natural parent consented to adoption.

R: Customary mwei mwei adoption factors include: entire community is made aware of adoption, it is rare for natural parent to reclaim mwei mwei adoptee, and rare for parent to give up only child 

R: court considers totality of circumstances 

R: testimony between natural and adoptive parents is no required to prove mwei mwei 

R: BOP is preponderance of evidence 

R: trial court has broad discretion in making evidentiary determinations. Improper exclusion of evidence will constitute reversible error if substantial right of appellant is affected

R: Opinions formed by judge do not constitute a basis for bias or partiality unless they display deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. A challenge to judge's comments can only succeed if judge's actions were so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment. 

In re Estate of Olopai, 2015 MP 3 

Issue: whether decedent adopted nephew through mwei mwei 

R: For purposes of intestate succession, unless family consents or agree otherwise, a person adopted by law or custom into a Carolinian family shall be treated as if he were born into Carolinian family.

R: A child adopted through Carolinian custom of mwei mwei is entitled to inherit from adoptive parents.

R: Under mwei mwei, adopting parents proposes to adopt a child and natural parent must consent.

R: Non-exclusive factors in determining mwei mwei: 1) whether natural parents consented to adoption 2) child's age at time of adoption (usually baby but 9,10,11 ok) 3) whether adoption was between relative 4) whether women initiated adoption 5) whether adopting parent was married 6) whether community was aware of adoption 7) whether natural parent reclaimed adoptee and 8) whether adoptee was natural parent's only child (totality of circumstances, preponderance of evidence) 

R: Carolinian custom of fa'am is similar to foster parent relationship. Under fa'am child is not entitled to inherit from foster parent. Agreement or dialogue concerning adoption is critical distinguishing factor btwn mwei mwei and fa'am. 

In re Estate of Reyes, 2012 MP 13

Facts: trial court granted easement by implication over appellant's property, the second lot, based on prior existing use to appellee. Appellant challenged judgment.

R: Probate law shall be liberally construed. Underlying policies and purposes including discovering and making effective the intent of decedent in distribution of his property, promoting speedy & efficient system for liquidating estate of decedent & making distribution to his successors. 

R: 14th amendment protects individual from deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process

R: to create easement by implicant there must have been 1) a joint ownership 2) a use was made of one part for the benefit of other, 3) it was severed 4) at time of severance, parties had reasonable grounds to expect that conveyance would not terminate prior use.

Factors: use was not temporary, continuance of prior use was reasonable necessary for enjoyment of dominant estate, existence of use was apparent, OR prior use was for underground utilities. 

R: Reasonably necessary does not mean strict necessity but mere inconvenience is not enough 

Holding: PC's finding that easement over second lot was reasonably necessary to appellee's use and enjoyment of first lost, was not clearly erroneous.

In re Matter of Villar, 2011 MP 7

Facts: Aunt appeals trial court's denial of petition finding minor had not resided in Commonwealth for the statutorily required 1 year 

Issue: whether minor time spent in Commonwealth on tourist VISA counts toward the 1 year residency requirement

R: Commonwealth Code states any "resident" under the age of 18 may be adopted...provided that purpose of adoption is not to circumvent or evade laws of CNMI or US law.

R: resident defined as individual who is physically present and living in Commonwealth for at least one year

R: the one year residency requirement has not intent element and time can accrue to satisfy this requirement even if child is on tourist VISA

Holding: Because statutory def of resident does not include intent as element, time spent in NMI on tourist visa counts toward 1 year residency.

In Re Anne-Marie Roy, 2007 MP 28

Facts: Prosecutor was ordered to show cause why she should not be sanctioned for failing to file appellate brief.

R: Every attorney is subject to Supreme Court disciplinary jurisdiction. Discipline may consist of disbarment, suspension, public censure, private reprimand, and/or any sanction deemed appropriate.

R: Supreme court has inherent authority to regulate attorney's conduct and impose sanctions not addressed by this rule. 

R: Purpose of suspension is not to punish but to guard administration of justice, maintain dignity of the court and integrity of profession and protect public.

R: But discipline must comport with due process providing notice and opportunity to respond

R: In determining discipline, court looks at nature of conduct, weight of cumulative violation, and harm to the public and profession 

Holding: Attorney failing to comply with appellate deadlines is prejudicial to administration of justice and sanction issued 

In re York, 2010 MP 11 

Facts: Applicant Attorney sought admission to pro hac vice in a particular case. Application was denied based on his unauthorized participation in deposition. Attorney sought review and asked court to set aside finding of unauthorized practice of law.

Issue: Whether practicing "law in this jurisdiction" is limited to the actual geographical boundaries or whether one may practice law "in this jurisdiction" by virtue of his or her active participation in a Commonwealth case wherever the proceeding may take place

R: One engages in the practice of law in NMI when he or she represents a client in a case that is filed under and governed by Commonwealth law

R: Courts in various jurisdictions have held similar intrusive behavior, including deposition, in which one advocates for his or her client qualifies as practice of law

R: Primary function of bar admission process is to protect residents & litigants of particular jurisdiction from actions taken by unfit attorneys

R: It ensures attorney has minimum competency & knowledge of local law that he or she may effective represent interests of his or her client

R: Court has plenary control over who may practice in the Commonwealth

R: While guideposts exists for determining admission, it is solely at the discretion of the Court

Holding: One engages in practice of law in this jurisdiction when he or she represents a client in a case that is filed under and governed by Commonwealth law. Sanction affirmed.

Kang Wong Hee v. Kyung Kuen Oh, 2011 MP 18

Facts: Marital property distribution resulted in trial court distributing all of Corp's asset to husband because the court concluded wife took clients of Corp

Issue: whether Commonwealth requires valuation of closely-held corporation supported by specific finings of fact before distributing 

R: trial court has broad discretion in distribution of marital property 

R: spouses have undivided one-half interest in marital property unless there's fraud or waste

R: all marital property must be valued prior to distribution because w/o proper valuation, court would have no ability to equally divide marital property when value of particular asset is not immediately apparent 

R: Nardini approach is used to valuate closely held corporation. Factors are: 1) nature of business and history of enterprise from its inception 2) economic outlook in general and condition and outlook of specific industry in particular 3) book value of stock and financial condition of business 4) earning capacity of company 5) dividend-paying capacity 6) whether or not enterprise has goodwill or other intangible value 7) sales of stock and size of block of stock to be valued 8) market price of stocks of corporations engaged in the same or similar line of business having their stocks traded in a free and open market

Holding: valuation of closely held corporation must be supported by findings of fact an thus court's order distributing all of Corp's assets to husband is remanded 

Peter-Pelican v. Commonwealth, 2012 MP 7 

Facts: Plaintiff, NMI Special Assistant to Governor filed action against Commonwealth in district court. District court found in favor of P awarding her damages. Commonwealth appealed. Ninth Circuit deferred submission of appeal pending supreme court's resolution of two certified questions.

Issue: Does Article II section 22 of NMI Constitution which states that the special assistant may be removed only for cause mean that special assistant may never be removed from that position without cause- even beyond the term of the appointing governor-or does it mean that SA is protected against termination without cause only during term of the appointing governor

R: Fed Cts may certify questions where 1) question may be determinative in the proceeding before federal court 2) NM Supreme Court has no controlling precedent 

R: Basic principal of constitutional construction: 1) language given its plain meaning 2) if susceptible to two meaning, its ambiguous, and must be read as whole to discover legislature's intent and must not be read to defy common sense 3) if ambiguous, courts must attempt to ascertain the drafter's intent 4) and to interpret language in a way that deviates from common law absent clear indication 5) if still ambiguous, look to rules of common law 

R: where constitutional provision prescribing term of a public office is uncertain or doubtful in its construction, that interpretation will be followed which limits the term to the shortest time

Holding: SA may be removed only for cause during term of appointing governor 

Premier Insurance Co., Inc. v. Dept. of Labor, 2012 MP 16 

Facts: trial court affirmed decision of appellee DOL finding appellant insurer liable for bond claims filed by employer. Issue: whether court's order should be set aside because DOL violated due process by providing notice via publication 

R: Due process clause of NMI Art I, section 5 requires notice and opportunity to be heard prior to deprivation of life, liberty, or property interest 

R: When P serves D by publication, inquiry is whether P exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to locate D. It is axiomatic that if D's name and address are known or may be obtained w/ reasonable diligence, service by publication will not satisfy requirements of due process. Service by publication should be the last resort

Holding: Due process was violated via service by publication and violation of fundamental constitutional right is not harmless error