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First nationwide authority for local land use regulation.
A building height limitation of 80 to 100 feet does not deprive the property owner of profitable use. |
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Eubank v. City of Richmond (1912) |
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Setbacks are constitutional |
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Hadacheck v. Sabastian (1915) |
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The restriction of uses is not a taking. |
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Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon (1922) |
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Restrictions on use are not a taking provided they do not go too far. |
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Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty (1926) |
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Upheld zoning classifications if classifications were reasonable. |
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Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City (1978) |
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Restrictions on use are legal as long as there is still some commercial value. |
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Agins v. City of Tiburon (1979) |
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Two prong test - a taking if: (i) does not substantially forward state interest or (ii) denies owner an economically viable use of their land |
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Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictus (1987) |
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Nature of state's interest in regulation is a critical factor in determining whether a taking has occurred. |
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Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987) |
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Must be a nexus between state's interest and exaction. |
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Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) |
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Required a reasonable relationship between conditions and impact. |
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First English Evangelical Lutheran Free Church v. County of Los Angeles (1987) |
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Money damages could be appropriate for a temporary taking. |
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Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992) |
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Restrictions on use must show nexus to nuisance. |
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Sultum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (1997) |
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Use regulation 'ripe for adjudication' prohibiting construction of permanent structures |
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Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board (1997) |
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Regulation that leaves some economically beneficial uses may still be a taking |
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Metromedia v. City of San Diego (1981) |
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Ordinance that placed tighter restrictions on non-commercial billboards than on commercial ones violated the First Amendment |
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Young v. American Mini Theaters (1976) |
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Communities can zone for location of adult entertainment establishments without necessarily violating the first amendment |
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Renton v. Playtime Theaters Inc. (1986) |
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Distance separation or concentration requirements for adult uses where the regulation serves a substantial governmental interest and leaves open alternative methods of communication |
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Aesthetics was a valid reason to support actions taken for the public welfare. (Eminent domain) |
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Moore v. City of East Cleveland (1977) |
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Cities cannot define "family" so that the definition prevents closely related individuals from living with each other |
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Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002) |
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The court decided that a three-year government moratorium on development was not a 'taking' of private property that requires payment of compensation |
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Golden v. Planning Board of the Town of Ramapo (1972) |
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Local governments can condition development approval on the provision of services. |
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Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma (1975) |
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Communities can restrict the number of building permits granted each year if reasonable |
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Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay v. City of Livermore (1976) |
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Court allowed time phasing of future residential growth until performance conditions were met |
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Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas (1974) |
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Extended concept of zoning under police power to include community's desire for certain types of lifestyles - upheld power to prohibit more than two unrelated individuals from residing together as a single family |
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Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (I) (1972) |
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Held that in New Jersey communities in growing areas in the way of urban expansion must take their fair share of the region's growth |
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Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (II) (1983) |
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Court held that regulations do not prevent a jurisdictions achieving a fair share of regional growth but that affirmative measures should be used to ensure that a fair share goal would be reached |
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Bove v Donner-Hanna Coke Corp. 1932
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Owner not be permitted to make an unreasonable use of his premises to the material annoyance of his neighbor if the latter's enjoyment of life or property is materially lessened.
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Court validated state and local government actions that properly protect the public health, morals and safety |
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Nectow v. City of Cambridge 1928 |
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Rational basis test. Zoning Ordinance was struck down b/c it had no valid public purpose. |
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Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 1982 |
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If regulation causes a physical invasion of privacy then it is a taking. |
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Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Development Corp 1977
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Regulation effectively denying housing to people based on race, immigartion status or natural origin is unconstituitional |
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City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center |
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ordinance that does treat different groups unequally, but does not invovle a fundamental right or gourp under village of arlington the it merely has to pass the rational basis test. |
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Members of City Council v. Vincent |
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Definition
Ordinance banning signs attached to utility poles. proved aesthetics can satisfy advancing a legitamite public interest. |
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Calvert Cliffs v. U.S. Atomic Enery Commission 1971 |
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Overturned approval of nuclear plant b/c AEC did not follow NEPA. Gave NEPA strength |
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Zoning cannot be used to give churches an advantage over commerrical establishments. Church could have day care but commercial entities couldn't |
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