While TFR declined since 1960, the % women with at least one child is relatively constant

Argues for later marriage.

Secular trends have reduced the socioeconomic motivations for high-parity births, but they have not eliminated the motivation to have children altogether

 “A century of demographic and cultural change in Western Europe.” Population and Development Review, 9(3), 411-435.

- Substantial fertility decline can only occur when fertility is brought under the realm of individual control

- Decreased demand for children in Western Europe corresponded with increased humanist values and reverence for the individual

- These ideals arose first in France and the US, which is also where fertility declined first

- Furthermore, this initial decline in marital fertility occurred in the late 18^th and early 19^th century, prior to the industrial revolution of the middle and late 19^th century

Lesthaeghe also argues that the recent fertility decline of the late 1960s and 1970s stems from decreased demand for kids due to increased labor opportunities for women and decline in relative income of younger generations

- In an empirical analysis of this theory, secularization and urbanization do indeed emerge as the two main factors responsibly for decreased demand for children

- In sum, both the 1^st and 2^nd demographic transitions reflect the same long-term shift in the Western ideational system

“Europe’s Second Demographic Transition.”

- This article was the first to push for using the term “second demographic transition” to explain the changes in fertility and family life that were occurring in developed countries

- Whereas the first demographic transition was altruistic in nature (motivated by improving quality of life for children) the second demographic transition is more individualistic (driven by the rights and self-fulfillment of individuals)

4 shifts characterize the 2^nd demographic transition

1. Shift from the golden age of marriage to the dawn of cohabitation

2. Shift from the era of the king-child with parents to the king-pair with child

3. Shift from preventative contraception to self-fulfilling contraception

4. Shift from uniform to pluralistic families and households

Patterns of marriage, divorce, and cohabitation

- In the 1970s, the idea of cohabitation as a “trial marriage” was largely replaced by the idea of cohabitation as an alternative to marriage

Patterns of fertility

- 3^rd and higher order births have dropped dramatically in developed countries since 1965

- Increase in out-of-wedlock births, particularly among older women

Patterns of contraception

- USSR was the first country to legalize abortion in 1920

- In Eastern Europe, abortion quite common (van da Kaa calculates that women in these countries have an average of 1 to 2.5 legal abortions in their lifetimes, compared to 0.2 to 0.6 elsewhere in Europe)

Patterns of living arrangements

- Divergence of “acceptable” household structure

3 areas of concern among pronatalists

1. Continuation of national populations

2. Continuation of cultural identity and world power

3. Future of the welfare state

- Although pronatalists policies (such as tax deductions or child subsidies) might be modestly effective, it is difficult to imagine them overcoming individualist desires and raising fertility to above replacement level

“The divorce of marriage and childbearing: Changing attitudes and behavior in the United States.” Population and Development Review, 19(2), 331-347.

This article documents the increasingly permissive attitudes of Americans toward nonmarital fertility from 1974-1989 using data from 4 cross-sectional surveys

- Then examines social and demographic correlates of these attitudes to ascertain whether the structure of the determinants changed over time or whether the attitudinal shift was pervasive across social strata

- For much of the 20^th century, American social scientists have viewed childbearing outside of marriage as deviant behavior

- During the past 20 or 30 years the structure of the American family has been changing

- Marriage and childbearing have become increasingly separate

- In 1950, 2% of births to White mothers nonmarital; in 1989, 19.2% of births to White mothers nonmarital

- In 1963, 26% of births to Black mothers nonmarital; in 1989, 65.7% of births to Black mothers nonmarital

- Although nonmarital childbearing rates for Whites have more than tripled since 1970, they are still lower than the rates for Blacks in 1963

- Using data from the American Women’s Polls, authors find that there has been a substantial increase in tolerance of nonmarital childbearing since 1974 for both men and women

- Both Blacks and Whites exhibit increased acceptability, although the level of acceptability higher for Blacks

- Multivariate analyses reveal that more recent and better-educated cohorts are more tolerant of nonmarital childbearing

- Nevertheless, also find evidence for a pervasive shift in values across all social strata

- Association between education and values appears to decrease over time (better-educated may have pioneered the attitude shift, but their effect has since diminished)

“The second demographic transition in Western countries: An interpretation.” In Gender and Family Change in Industrialized Countries. Pp. 17-62.

3 phases of the second demographic transition

- 1^st phase (1955-1970) involved increasing prevalence of divorce, secular declines in fertility, and increasing age at marriage

- 2^nd phase (1970-1985) involved spread of premarital cohabitation from Nordic countries to the rest of the West

- 3^rd phase (1985-onward) involved a plateau in divorce rates

- Motivations for the first and second demographic transitions differed considerably

- According to Aries (1980), the first transition was motivated primarily by altruistic concerns for the wellbeing of children, whereas the second transition was motivated by increasing individualism

- Some sources of motivations underlying the second demographic transition include increased quality-related demands placed on individuals with respect to adult relationships, individual autonomy, anti-authoritarian ideology, and advanced consumerism and market orientation

- One interesting pattern of the second transition is that the changes in union formation and procreation occurred in much shorter a time period than those associated with the first transition

- Despite the apparent cohesiveness in the driving forces of the second transition, countries continue to exhibit idiosyncracies

- Furthermore, ethnic minorities within countries display heterogeneity with respect to family behavior

- Nevertheless, Lesthaeghe argues that the changes associated with the second transition are here to stay and that the probability for a return to the previous situation of family and fertility behavior is practically nil

“Recent trends in fertility and household formation in the industrialized world.” Review of Population and Social Policy, 9, 121-170.

Review of explanations for the patterns characteristic of the SDT

Neoclassical microeconomic theory states that female education led to more female economic autonomy, higher costs of entry into a union, and higher opportunity costs associated with childbearing and childrearing

Easterlin’s (1976) relative deprivation theory states that consumption aspirations requires extra hh income, provided by female labor

Ideational theories point to reduced legitimacy of normative regulation and authority, increased secularism and individual ethical autonomy, and growing respect for individual choices

- However, heterogeneity in patterns of leaving home and hh formation suggest that other mechanisms need to be accounted for, such as. . .

1. Different patterns of diffusion across social strata within countries

2. Different policies and policy responses

3. Different reactions to periods of economic hardship

4.  Country or region specific cultural traits

Article analyzes the recent period changes in fertility in industrialized countries from the point of view of fertility postponement at younger ages and subsequent partial recuperation at later ages

Ways in which the US is anomalous compared to other western countries

- Teenage fertility has remained very high

- No decline in fertility at ages 20-24 or 25-29 since cohorts reaching adulthood in late 60s and early 70s

- Steady rises in fertility after age 30 and age 35

- Large differences by education (women with a college education have exhibited the postponement common of other western countries)

- Outcome is that current period fertility rates are diverging because of differential recuperation in Western countries and Japan and strong reaction to economic overhaul of Eastern Europe in 1989

- Eastern European countries mostly displaying a quantum reduction rather than a tempo effect

- One group of western countries has displayed postponement with relatively strong recuperation after age 30 (Scandinvia, GB, Fr)

- Other group has displayed postponement with very little recuperation (Italy, Spain, Begium, Germany, and Switzerland)

- End of postponement would not bring period TFRs back to replacement level unless fertility at older ages rose drastically

Household formation also becoming destandardized

- Historical context matters quite a bit for new hh patterns

- Main determinants of independent living and premarital cohabitation (as opposed to prolonged stay in the parental hh and marriage) are. . .

1. Expansion of the welfare state

2. Prolongation of education

3. Emergence of a more libertarian culture with greater tolerance for alternative lifestyles

4. Intergenerational transmission of family instability

- Not only is the actual experience of instability in the familial hh a correlate of this phenomenon, but also weaker familistic values in the parental generation

Main determinants of postponement of first marriage are. . .

- Advanced education

- Growing labor market flexibility (less secure and structured career development)

- Cycles characterized by weakened economic opportunities for new cohorts

- Unfavorable conditions (higher rents, purchase prices)

- Rising material aspiration and consumerism

- Greater distrust in the institution of marriage

- Social diffusion of alternative living arrangements

- More idiosyncratic or culture specific factors (for example, rising individual and autonomous partner choice replacing arranged marriage in Japan)

Cross-national variation in the household positions of women aged 20-24

a. Resident in parental hh

    - Very common in southern Europe (about 80%!)

b. Living alone

     - High prevalence in Northern Europe

     - High prevalence in Japan

c. Cohab without children

     - High prevalence in Western Europe

     - High prevalence in Northern Europe

d. Cohab with children

     - High prevalence in Western Europe

     - High prevalence in Northern Europe

e. Single mother

     - High prevalence in Eastern Europe

f. Married without children

g.  Married with children

     - High prevalence in Eastern Europe

“The limits to low fertility: A biosocial approach.”

- Questions of concern to demographers today:

1. how low can fertility fall?

2. whether, given true choice in the matter for the first time in history, humans might cease to reproduce altogether given the high physiological, temporal, and financial costs involved in raising children for the required 20 years or so?

Foster argues that humans’ (especially women’s) “need to nurture” will prevent fertility from falling even further

- Women have a biologically based predisposition toward nurturing or maternal behavior that interacts with environmental stimuli, resulting, in most cases, in a conscious motivation for bearing at least one child

- A number of factors modify the relationship between this predisposition to nurture and the decision to have a child, including:

1) being in a relationship with a like-minded partner,

2) perceived costs of childbearing,

3) perceived benefits of childbearing,

4) financial circumstances,

5) career opportunity costs, and

6) age

“Post-transition fertility.”

2 main conclusions of paper

1. Stabilization levels for countries now in fertility transition will be similar to those in contemporary countries with TFRs around 2.0

- This conclusion primarily based on evidence from past trends

2. In all countries, once low fertility is reached, future change is indeterminate

3 characteristics of low fertility trends

1. Best characterized as period trends, not cohort trends (all cohorts have experienced shift in fertility at the same time)

2. Trends have involved both a reduction in the total number of births and a change in the timing of births

3. Reduction of the number of births has primarily occurred at higher order births

- However, we must not forget vast differences in fertility levels among subgroups within countries

Reasons for additional decreases in low fertility countries include:

desire for self-actualization,

increased age at marriage,

increased rates of divorce,

socioeconomic depression

destabilization due to wars, and

increased opportunities for women

- To increase fertility in low-fertility countries, governments should institute policies that make it easier to combine work and family

- Tax deductions and child subsidies might have a modest effect, but the above suggestion would likely have a much larger effect

“Fertility and reproductive preferences in post-transitional societies.” Population and Development Review, 27, 260-281.

Objective of paper is to examine the relationship between reproductive preferences and observed fertility

- Theories of fertility often assume that couples are able to implement their fertility preferences without much difficulty, but empirical research suggests this is not the case

- For instance, in most developed countries, desired fertility is about 2.0, but observed fertility is below this

- Below-replacement fertility has also been observed in some developing populations, particularly in Southeast Asia

Trends in observed and desired fertility

- Early in the fertility transition, desired fertility exceeded observed

3 reasons why observed exceeded desired

1. Unwanted fertility (typically not high prior to the transition, but increases during the transition when desired fertility drops before observed)

2. Replacement of deceased children

3. Sex preferences

As populations progress through the last stages of the transition, observed fertility usually decreases to a level below desired fertility

3 reasons why observed fertility below desired fertility

1. Rising age at childbearing (tempo effects have temporary implications for the TFR, but foregone childbearing has permanent implications)

2 Involuntary infertility (4 reasons for this are

1) Inability to find a suitable partner,

2) Union disruption,

3) Physiological sterility,

4) Disease-induced sterility)

3. Competing preferences

- Although there are reasons to be concerned about currently low levels of fertility, this may be a temporary phenomenon

- Bongaarts believes we should really start to worry when desired, rather than observed fertility, drops below 2.0

“The emergence of lowest-low fertility in Europe during the 1990s.”  Population and Development Review.

- Objectives of paper:

investigate the emergence and persistence of lowest-low fertility in Europe,

analyze its demographic patterns and socioeconomic determinants, and

address the factors that underlie the divergence of fertility levels in Europe and developed countries more generally

- Authors define lowest-low fertility as a TFR below 1.3

- This level of fertility implies a 1.5% annual decline in fertility in a stable population with an overall mean age at birth of 30 years

- Also implies a reduction of every birth cohort by 50% and a halving of the stable population  every 45 years

- 13 countries in Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe attained lowest-low fertility in the 1990s

5 factors contributed to the emergence and persistence of lowest-low fertility

1. Tempo distortions that reduce the TFR below the associated level of cohort fertility

- However, there exists little evidence for “pure” postponement (increasing age at first birth is associated with lower completed fertility)

2. Socioeconomic changes—including increased returns to human capital and high economic uncertainty in early adulthood—that have made late childbearing a rational response for individuals/couples

- The three lowest-low fertility countries in Southern Europe also had the highest youth unemployment rates in the EU in the 1990s

- Economic uncertainty -> increasing returns to education ->further postponement of births

3. Social interaction effects that reinforce this behavioral adjustment and cause postponement transitions with large and persistent changes in the mean age at birth

- Social interactions contribute to the diffusion of postponement even beyond countries/regions with socioeconomic incentives

- Thus, it is likely that postponement will persist even if economy improves

4. Institutional settings that favor a low quantum of fertility

- Lack of institutional support for working parents

- Lack of gender equity within households

5. Postponement-quantum interactions that amplify the consequences of this institutional setting when it is combined with a rapid delay in childbearing

- The main driver of lowest-low fertility has been declines in higher parity births (most people still have one birth)

- This suggests that even in lowest-low contexts, the incentives for children are sufficiently strong to induce women to have at least one birth

Some questions that remain

- Is lowest-low fertility a permanent, long-term phenomenon or is it merely transient?

- Will fertility continue to decline beyond lowest-low levels?

- Will lowest-low fertility spread beyond Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe?

- Has the postponement of childbearing in lowest-low countries reached its limit?

Authors suggest that policies designed to increase the compatibility of work and children are the most promising for reversing trends toward lowest-low fertility

“Population policy dilemmas in Europe at the dawn of the twenty-first century.” Population and Development Review, 29(1), 1-28.

Discussion of political and social problems inherent in Europe’s population predicament

- The intrinsic rate of growth in Europe based on current levels of fertility and mortality is -0.0146

- Such a decline would bring the population to half its current size in 47 years

- Comparison of growth between 1950 and 2050 in Russia and Yemen reveals drastic nature of this phenomenon

- Russia projected to decline by 40 million people between 2000 and 2050

- Yemen projected to increase by 81 million people between 2000 and 2050

- This would bring its population to 102 million, which is more than 24 times its size in 1950!

- This comparison is emblematic of future global demographic picture; Europe projected to shrink while countries in North and West Africa (Europe’s southern hinterland) expected to grow by enormous amounts

Potential policy responses

1. Do nothing and embrace reduced population size

 - Has the benefit of easing strain on natural resources

- However, large population size may also be linked to political and military power, so Europe may not want to let these go

2. Governments could also attempt to raise fertility

- However, this goes against a long tradition of laissez-faire  governance, where governments stayed out of personal decisions

- The most common “pronatalist” policy today is to make participation for women in the labor force compatible with raising children

- These types of policies could backfire if they result in the devaluation of parenthood and ultimately serve to lower fertility

- Governments have also tried to provide monetary incentives to parents, but these do not appear to have had large effects of couple’s fertility decisions

3. Finally, governments could embrace immigrants

- Although there has been a lot of resistance to embracing immigration, Demeny thinks that continued immigration is inevitable

- Although this may not be enough to halt the current population decline in Europe, it will moderate it considerably

“The changing institutional context of low fertility.” Population Research and Policy Review, 22, 411-438.

- Until the 1980s, the association between country-level TFR and female labor force participation (FLFP) was negative

- During the 1980s, a shift occurred and this relationship became positive

- Since 1990 it has been strongly positive

- Incompatibility of work and family roles undoubtedly contributed to the negative association between TFR and FLFP

- Work and family incompatible because of the opportunity costs of foregone wages and the time pressures of managing both roles

- This incompatibility has affected women more than men because women typically take responsibility for childrearing

- However, the incompatibility of work and child-rearing is not a given; it varies over time and across countries

3 ways to reconciles work and childrearing are:

1. providing child-care,

2. offering flexible work hours, or

3. shifting gender roles so men take on more childrearing responsibilities

- Those countries that have minimized incompatibility between work and childrearing are likely to see high proportions of women who are working and mothers

- In contrast, countries that do not minimize incompatibility are likely to have low proportions working and mothers, because women have to choose between the two roles         

- Nevertheless, it is conceivable that other factors contributed to declining fertility in countries with low FLFP:

a. such as high unemployment rates, or

b. the particular familial and kinship patterns of certain countries

“Low fertility at the turn of the twenty-first century.” Annual Review of Sociology, 32, 375-399.

Overview of trends and causes of very low fertility

Trends

- Greece, Italy, and Spain have lowest TFRs at 1.25, 1.28, and 1.27 respectively

- US has highest TFR of low fertility countries (just below replacement)

Decomposing low fertility

- Shift from high fertility to low fertility regime during demographic transition mostly resulted from declining number of higher parity births

- In contrast, the second demographic transition to lowest low fertility hinges on the behavior of women with no or few births (Ryder 1980)

Age at childbearing also important

- Shift toward later mean age at first birth leads to temporary drop in TFR that will go away once mean age stops shifting

- Nevertheless, timing and quantum of births are not unrelated

- Later childbearing leaves lowers risk of unintended pregnancy, increases the risk of sub- or infecundability, and allows couples to alter (usually lower) their fertility intentions

- Some factors that may lead to birth postponement include socioeconomic incentives for women and social norms

- Some more fundamental factors influencing low fertility

- Gidden’s (1991) theory of the deinstitutionalization of the modern life course stresses how children have become optional and parenting is seen as something that should contribute to self-actualization

- McDonald stresses how disjuction between gender equity at work versus home contributes to low fertility

- Esping-Anderson (1999) categorizes countries into groups representing different types of labor market, state, and family to show how fertility in social-democratic countries like Norway differs from fertility in conservative regimes like Italy

- Goldin and Katz (2000) stress the role of the pill in changing women’s decisions regarding their career and marriage (makes it possible to invest in expensive, long-term job training without sacrificing sex or relationships)

- Future research should examine the factors influencing women’s fertility intentions and why these intentions are often not realized

 “No babies?”  New York Times.

Describes patterns of low fertility in Europe and the US, and people’s responses to it

- Southern Europe, particularly Italy, Greece, and Spain, have the lowest fertility in the world

            - Other parts of Europe also have fertility below replacement level

- The number one reason for extremely low fertility in Southern Europe is difficulty combining work and family

            - Traditional gender roles at home combined with gender equity in the workplace

- Northern Europe has higher fertility due to its generous welfare policies for parents

- The US also has relatively high fertility, not because of generous welfare benefits, but because of its flexible job market (easier for women to leave and re-enter the job market)

- Many are concerned about demographic and economic consequences of this phenomenon

- Issues of low fertility are inherently ties to issues of immigration

- Massive flows of young immigrants would be necessary to offset these demographic problems, but few Europeans are in favor of such a policy

-Some people are not so pessimistic about falling birth rates, however

- They see smaller populations as an opportunity to better quality of life

“Advances in development reduce fertility declines.” Nature, 460(6), 741-743.

- More than half of the global population now lives in regions with below replacement level fertility (2.1 TFR)

- However, authors find that especially high levels of human development are associated with a rebound of fertility from very low levels

- Although the general trend in the relationship between socioeconomic conditions and fertility is negative, at some inflection point this trend reverses and becomes positive

Future research should examine how improved labor-market flexibility, social security and individual welfare, gender and economic equality, human capital and social/family policy facilitate higher fertility in developed countries

- At a high level of development, governments might turn to making economic success and family life more compatible for women in order to increase fertility

“The unfolding story of the second demographic transition.” Population Studies Center Research Report 10-696.

- Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa were the first to articulate the theory of the ^2nd demographic transition in 1986

- Various trends have characterized the second demographic transition (SDT)

- Rising divorce rates (beginning in the 1950s)

- Falling fertility (1960s)

- Increasing proportions single

- Increase in premarital cohabitation

- Decline in remarriage following divorce and widowhood

- Procreation within cohabiting unions (1980s, Northern and Western Europe)

Present article organized in terms of various criticisms of SDT and Lesthaeghe’s responses

1. The SDT is merely a continuation of the first demographic transition (FDT)

- With regards to marriage, the FDT is characterized by rise in proportions marrying, low or reduced cohab, low divorce, and high remarriage

- The SDT is characterized by fall in proportions marrying,rise in cohab, rise in divorce, decline in remarriage

- With regards to fertility patterns, the FDY is characterized by decline in fertility at older ages, deficient contraception, declining illegit fertility, low childlessness in unions

- In contrast, the SDT characterized by postponement of parenthood, efficient contraception, rising extra-marital fertility, rising childlessness in unions

- Lesthaeghe argues that during the FDT contraception was adopted in order to avoid pregnancies; in the SDT contraception is stopped to start a pregnancy

- The pattern of cyclical fertility predicted by Easterlin (1973) in which small cohorts would have more children due to better economic opportunities never occurred; small cohorts did not increase fertility following the baby bust

- With regard to sociocultural patterns, the FDT was concerned with obtaining basic material needs, rising membership in civic and community groups, strong normative regulation by states and churches, segregated gender roles, and ordered life course transitions

- In contrast, the SDT concerned with realization of higher-order, non-material needs, disengagement from civic and community groups, retreat of the state and increased secularization, rising symmetry of gender roles, and flexible life course organization

- In sum, the one transition view fails to recognize that:

1. the FDT and SDT are differentiated and somewhat antagonistic in terms of many family formation variables,

2. that they correspond to two different historical phases, and

3. that they have very different implications for future population growth (or decline)

2. The SDT is unique to Northern and Western Europe

- In Central and Eastern Europe, many features of the SDT became apparent after the collapse of Communist regimes in 1989

- However, Lestaeghe doesn’t think trends will return to how they were once economies start doing better; values appear to have changed

- Southern Europe has also witnessed many features of the SDT

- One exception is that marriage remains the predominant precondition for procreation, although some data suggest extra-marital fertility in Italy is increasing

3. Features of the SDT appear to be progressing differently in different countries

- For instance, although delaying childbearing is a very common feature of the SDT, there exists variation in whether or not cohorts recuperate delayed births

- More evidence is needed to explain differential recuperation of fertility across countries

- One factor that may lead to increased recuperation at later ages is ease of combining work and family

4. The SDT hasn’t spread to non-Western populations

- Lesthaeghe provides evidence that this simply is not the case

 4 features that a country must exhibit to suggest that the SDT is occurring

1. Sub-replacement fertility linked to fertility postponement

2. Rising age at marriage linked to growing prominence of free partner choice and female autonomy

3. Premarital cohabitation more common and acceptable

4. Individual connections between demographic features and value orientations

- Based on these factors, the SDT appears to be occurring in Japan, South Korea, and Singapore

Finally, Lesthaeghe ends with 4 future predictions based on SDT

1. Normative and institutional props supporting traditional union formation and hh structures will continue to weaken

2. Self-realization will become a major goal in its own right

3. New technologies will spread the values and behaviors of the SDT to developing countries

4. Fundamentalist reactions will occur, but will not stem the overall shift toward “post-materialist” values

“Advances in development reduce fertility declines.” Nature, 460(6), 741-743.

- More than half of the global population now lives in regions with below replacement level fertility (2.1 TFR)

- However, authors find that especially high levels of human development are associated with a rebound of fertility from very low levels

- Although the general trend in the relationship between socioeconomic conditions and fertility is negative, at some inflection point this trend reverses and becomes positive

Future research should examine how improved labor-market flexibility, social security and individual welfare, gender and economic equality, human capital and social/family policy facilitate higher fertility in developed countries

- At a high level of development, governments might turn to making economic success and family life more compatible for women in order to increase fertility