AB-CCW

Cook Notes:

AB-CC-0001           Component Cooling Abnormality

(Rev.13)

Entry Conditions:

Low header pressure (70 psig, standby pump starts)

SW system abnormality

Leakage from system (Surge tank Hi/Lo level 58/41%)

System to system boundary leakage

Continuous Actions:

Trip RCPs  (ATT 2) if any one of the following conditions exist: 

CC lost to all RCPs (motor bearing overheating)

Seal Injection and Thermal Barrier CC flow lost concurrently (2 minutes until seal & bearing damage)

Valid BRG CLG WTR FLO LO and

Motor bearing temperature reaches 175°F (prevent motor bearing failure)

5 minutes elapsed since BRG CLG WTR FLO LO alarm

All CC pumps stopped

Surge tank level can not be maintained >5%

Frequent containment sump pump starts with CC low header pressure alarm.

Stop CC pump if low or erratic amps are indicated (minimize damage due to cavitation)

If due to loss of SW, initiate AB.SW-0001

If RHR in operation, initiate AB-RHR-0001 or -0002

If 21SW127fails closed during 22 Nuc SW Hdr outage - fail valve open

If 22SW127fails closed during 21 Nuc SW Hdr outage - fail valve open

Attachment 2: RCP tripping

If RTBs closed

Trip the reactor

Trip affected RCP(s)

If a TOTAL LOSS of Component Cooling Water was the initiating event (including loss of CCW to the CVCS Letdown Heat Exchanger), Then ISOLATE RCS letdown AND SWAP charging pump suction to the RWST

If the CC leak in CAN with CC113 & CC215 closed was the initiating event, THEN isolate CC to and from the RCPs

Go to EOP-TRIP-1

If RTBs open

Trip affected RCP(s)

If a TOTAL LOSS of Component Cooling Water was the initiating event (including loss of CCW to the CVCS Letdown Heat Exchanger), THEN ISOLATE RCS letdown AND SWAP charging pump suction to the RWST

If the CC leak in CAN with CC113 & CC215 closed was the initiating event, THEN isolate CC to and from the RCPS

When all RCPs are stopped, initiate AB.RC-0004 (Nat Circ)

Paths:

Lowering Surge Tank Level:

Initiate makeup to maintain level >42% (DR107 or WR114) and ensure only one makeup valve (CC) is open (CC145 or CC146).  (permits split of system for leak identification – a single failure in this area would result in a total loss of CC).  Makeup flow rate from DR107 is approximately 200gpm.

Observe WHUT, RHR sump, and Aux. building sump levels to identify leak location. determine whether in or outside of CAN
Attachment 3 isolates affected components when identified.

If leak is in CAN, isolate Excess Letdown

If surge tank level cannot be maintained >5%, stop RCPs w/ Att 2.

If neither surge tank level can be maintained >38%, initiate a unit shutdown (baffle height 37.5%)

If one level can be maintained >38%, implement Attachment 4

Rising Surge Tank Level: 

Ensure makeup is isolated (2DR107) and 2WR114.  Locate and identify sources of in-leakage.  If SW is leaking chlorides will rise, if RCS is leaking R17 levels will rise

If R17A or R17B are in warning or alarm go to AB-RAD-0001(which directs entry into AB-RC-0001)

If surge tank level is rising and overflow is imminent, stop processing the in-service WHUT.  If level is rising slowly, drain the surge tank to drums as necessary to prevent overflow.  Maintain level <58% for cases where R17A/B are NOT in warning or alarm.

Low Header Pressure (<70psig):

If either CC HDR PRESSURE LO alarm is in alarm, start available pumps to clear alarms.

Stop CC pump(s) if low or erratic amps are indicated (minimize damage due to cavitation)

If all CC pumps are tripped, go to ATT 2 and trip RCPs

High CC System Temperature:

If CCHX outlet temperatures are high or rising (>99^oF during normal operations or >120^oF for first 3hrs during plant shutdown):

If SW header pressure is lost, initiate AB.SW-0001

Send an operator to adjust SW controllers for affected CCHX

If 23 PDP is in service, switch to a centrifugal CVC pump

Isolate CC to non-critical components to reduce CC demand (if adjusting SW flow to HX does not stabilize temperatures)

If CCHX outlet temperatures continue to rise, go to ATT 2 and trip RCPs

Attachment 4: Isolate 21 header and observe 22 surge tank level.  If level is still dropping unisolate 21 header, isolate 22 header and observe 21 surge tank level.  If both levels dropped when the opposite header was isolated, the leak is on the non-safeguards header.

Console Alarms:

CC HDR PRESS LO – 70 psig, standby pump auto starts

SURGE TANK LVL HI/LO – 58.7%/41.3%

CC HDR ACTIVITY HI – 1.8E4 cpm, closes 2CC149

DISCH FLOW HI – 175 gpm, closes 1CC131; if 1CC131 does not close, close 1CC190

DISCH FLOW LO – 145 gpm

o         CC131 failed closed, what is the plant impact.

Loss of Component Cooling water return from the RCP Thermal Barrier.

Impact is minimum to the plant unless loss of Seal injection is concurrent with the loss of CCW to the Thermal barrier

2 Minutes until seal and bearing Damage.

o        Failed closed, LTDN temp will rise, normally maintained at 100F, CV21 would open when temp reached 136F. The rise in temperature on the resin beds (as the temp approached the 136F limit) would cause any Boron in the beds to be released in to the RCS, resulting in a negative reactivity and lowering Tave.

Failed open would subsequently lower LTDN temperature and the resin beds would hold more boron resulting in a positive reactivity raising Tave eventually.

o        Impact of Loss of All CCW to RCPs, what is the plant Impact?

o        What systems will leak in (higher pressure systems like RCS)?

1. DM or PW Inleakage: DR107 or W114
2. SW Inleakage: 21/22 CC Heat X
3. Primary: RCP Thermal Barrier
4. Leatdown HX
5. Excess HX
6. Seal Water HX
7. All ECCS Pumps (23 Charging, SI, RHR)
8. RHR HX
9. PASS HX
10. 2R19 RM HX 

o        What systems will CCW leak in to (lower pressure systems)?

1. Spent Fuel Pit HX
2.  21/22 Waste Gas compressor HX

CCW Tank Level Impacts:

Lowering:

Lowering Surge Tank Level:

Initiate makeup to maintain level >42% (DR107 or WR114) and ensure only one makeup valve (CC) is open (CC145 or CC146).  (permits split of system for leak identification – a single failure in this area would result in a total loss of CC).  Makeup flow rate from DR107 is approximately 200gpm.

Observe WHUT, RHR sump, and Aux. building sump levels to identify leak location. determine whether in or outside of CAN
Attachment 3 isolates affected components when identified.

If leak is in CAN, isolate Excess Letdown

If surge tank level cannot be maintained >5%, stop RCPs w/ Att 2.

If neither surge tank level can be maintained >38%, initiate a unit shutdown (baffle height 37.5%)

If one level can be maintained >38%, implement Attachment 4

CCW Tank Level Impacts:

Rising:

Overflow to the ABV and then to the in Service WHUT

Rising Surge Tank Level: 

Ensure makeup is isolated (2DR107) and 2WR114.  Locate and identify sources of in-leakage.  If SW is leaking chlorides will rise, if RCS is leaking R17 levels will rise

If R17A or R17B are in warning or alarm go to AB-RAD-0001(which directs entry into AB-RC-0001)

If surge tank level is rising and overflow is imminent, stop processing the in-service WHUT.  If level is rising slowly, drain the surge tank to drums as necessary to prevent overflow.  Maintain level <58% for cases where R17A/B are NOT in warning or alarm.

AB-SW-1 Loss of SW Pressure

Cook Notes

AB-SW-0001           Loss of Service Water Header Pressure

(Rev. 16)

Entry Conditions:

Any verified abnormal reduction in SW header pressure

Any verified SW leak which results in a SW pressure reduction

Any verified flooding caused by a SW leak

Continuous Actions:

If SW pump cavitation (fluctuating amps, pressure, unusual noise)occurs and additional SW pumps can not be started reduce flow demand IAW ATT 2 (loads affected by loss of SW) (starting additional pumps reduces the flow through any 1 pump and the NPSH)

If the leak isolation would result in a total loss of SW to both nuclear headers while critical, perform a Unit shutdown no Trip to Mode 3 as rapidly as possible (isolating the leak would place the unit in an unanalyzed condition)

If the leak isolation results in a total loss of SW to CC while RHR is in service initiate AB-RHR-0001

Any time 2B Vital bus and another Vital bus are BOTH de-energized, send an operator to close 2SW26(Should take < 30 minutes; you are probably down to one pump – in runout).

IF AT ANY TIME, loss of Service Water pressure is due to loss of a 4KV Vital Bus, THEN INITIATE S2.OP-AB.4KV-000X, Loss of _ 4KV Vital Bus.

Paths:

If there is indication of a SW leak in a SW bay go to AB-SW-0003 (indicated by sump high levels)

Start SW pumps to maintain 95-150 psig (performed after a bay leak is verified to not be occurring – would increase leak rate) (auto start occurs at 95.5 psig)

If the leak or malfunction is on the turbine header go to AB-SW-0002

Both nuclear headers in service?

 No

Nuc Header Outage go to AB-SW-0004

Loss of all SW goto AB-SW-0005

Yes

Leak in Aux Bldg – Attachment 4

Diesels – Stop and Lock Out, isolate

Leak in Containment (CFCUs) – Attachment 5

The time the SW 58 and SW72 are shut should be minimized since thermal overpressure protection is removed

Close the outlet, SW72, first and then the inlet, SW58 last

Malfunctioning Valve – Attachment 6

Pump discharge check valve

Rack down breaker

Isolate SW3

C/T

T/S 3.7.4

Malfunction of 21SW122, 22SW122, 21SW127, or 22SW127

Throttle inlet, or swap CC HXs

T/Ss 3.6.1.1, 3.7.3, .3.7.4, and S2.OP-SO.SW-0005

Malfunction of 2SW308 or 2SW311 - isolate

Comments:

Screen wash pressure must be ≥55 psig for SWTS to operate.

TAC HX, CCW HX, and CFCUs have a significant impact on SW header pressure.

Attachment 2 – Loads Affected by a Loss of Service Water

AB-SW-3 Service Water Bay Leak

Cook Notes

AB-SW-0003           Service Water Bay Leak

(Rev. 7)

Entry Conditions:

A leak has been detected in a SW bay that has caused a low header pressure condition

Continuous Actions:

If loss of RHR cooling due to loss of SW, then AB.RHR-0001

If any turbine or generator bearing (210°F) or cold gas temperature (114°F) (reaches the trip setpoint)

If <P-9, trip the turbine and initiate AB-TRB-0001

If ≥P-9, Trip | Confirm | EOP-TRIP-1

If the main turbine is in operation monitor the following (for necessity to reduce unit load):

Oil cooler outlet temperature (115°F)¹

21/22 SGFP oil cooler outlet temperature (130°F)^1
1 (if any oil temperature reaches the indicated reduction point, THEN REDUCE unit load as necessary IAW the appropriate IOPs AND TRIP the affected Main Turbine/SGFP)

Stator coil outlet temperature (167°F) (runback at 176°F if in Auto) – OHA H44²

TAC temperature high (96°F) – OHA G24^2
2 (if a TAC temperature alarm occurs, THEN REDUCE power as necessary IAW the appropriate IOPs AND SECURE turbine gland sealing steam)

Modes 1-4: With a bay removed from service – remove one CCHX

Modes 1-4 and only two SW pumps available from different busses – initiate isolation of two CFCUs

If necessary to reduce the number of Service Water Pumps in operation AND a Service Water Bay is removed from service, THEN STOP the Service Water Pump fed from “B” bus in the OPERABLE Service Water Bay (23 or 24)

Subsequent Actions:

If both bays are in service send an operator to locate leak

Open SW23s and shut SW17s (to determine source / bay)

If leak is in Bay 2 start all bay 4 pumps and stop all bay 2 pumps

Deenergize control power for bay 2 pumps

Isolate bay 2 by shutting 21SW22 and 21SW20

If the leak is isolated ensure DG cooling available from 22SW21

If the leak is isolated ensure turbine building cooling through 23SW20 or go to AB.SW-0002

If necessary to shutdown a pump stop 24 (ensures a ‘B’ pump on SI actuation)

Remove 1 CCHX from service and isolate two CFCUs (prevent pump runout on an accident with both CCHXs and 5 CFCUs in slow and water hammer in CFCUs)

If leak is in Bay 4 start all bay 2 pumps and stop all bay 4 pumps

Deenergize control power for bay 4 pumps

Isolate the leak by shutting 22SW22 and 23SW20

If the leak is still not isolated, close 21SW20 and 2SW26 (turbine header now isolated)

If the leak is isolated ensure DG cooling available from 21SW21

If the leak is isolated ensure turbine building cooling through 21SW20 or go to AB.SW-0002

If necessary to shutdown a pump stop 23 (ensures a ‘B’ pump on SI actuation)

Remove 1 CCHX from service and isolate two CFCUs (prevent pump runout on a Mode Op I with both CCHXs and 5 CFCUs in slow and water hammer in CFCUs)

If only a single bay is in service when this procedure is entered:

Send an operator to determine the origin of the leak

If the leak is in bay 2 shut 21SW20 and initiate AB-SW-0002³

If the leak is in bay 4 shut 23SW20 and initiate AB-SW-0002^3
3 (AB.SW-0002 initiation is before asking if leakage has stopped because it could require a significant amount of time for an operator to reach the bay to confirm this action. Isolation of the turbine header will cause a pressure rise. This header pressure response could mislead the operator in thinking the leak has been isolated. In the meantime, actions must be taken for loss of Service Water to the turbine header. This may, depending on conditions, require tripping the reactor.)

If the leak is not isolated reduce running SW pumps to 1 in operation

If the reactor is critical, Trip | Confirm | EOP-TRIP-1 (reenter this procedure ASAP)

If the RCS is on RHR initiate AB-RHR-0001

Reduce SW loads as much as possible (Att 2)

Reduce CC loads as much as possible (Att 3)

One bay isolated:

One alignment of concern will occur after a SEC Mode I (Accident Only). In this condition, the pumps in the operating bay are aligned through a single supply header to both auxiliary building nuclear headers via the auxiliary building cross-tie valves (SW23s). Although the TGA is automatically isolated from the nuclear header by the SEC Mode Op, all operable CFCUs will also be started in low speed (high SW flow) and both CCHXs (as well as other system flow demands) will remain in service. This is a potentially large flow demand, through a single supply header immediately following the automatic SEC alignment, that can exist for an extended period.

This specific alignment has been addressed as follows:

With three operating pumps in the bay supplying the plant, limit the equipment aligned by isolating one CCHX via the normal operating procedures. This action will ensure component flow and pressure requirements are met if this alignment were to exist for the duration of accident mitigation.

With three operable pumps, but only two operating (i.e. during cold weather), limit the equipment aligned as above and run the two pumps on the same power bus. This will ensure that three pumps will be running to supply the Mode Op 1 condition, since this is already an LCO alignment and single failures are not postulated. On this Mode Op, the SEC will maintain the two running pumps and start the third pump on the other bus.

With only two operable pumps from different vital busses, limit flow by isolating two CFCUs in addition to the CCHX. This will eliminate a concern with the potential for conditions to exceed saturation resulting in water hammer in the CFCU Service Water piping. Therefore, a maximum of three CFCUs and one CCHX are permitted to be aligned for operation with one SW Bay inoperable under this procedure and only two Service Water Pumps powered from different vital busses operable.

AB-COND-0001       Loss of Condenser Vacuum

(Rev. 15)

Entry Conditions:

An unexpected rise in condenser backpressure when vacuum is required

OHA G-5 CNDSR VAC LO (≤ 25”Hg)

OHA G-13 CNDSR VAC LO-LO (≤ 22”Hg)

Differences:

AB.Load– rates not specifically called out

AB.Grid– SMD runbacks, Grid low voltage, ≤15% / min

AB.CW   – Possible load reduction to ≤83%, <5% / min – or  AB.Load

Continuous Actions:

If RCS temperature ≤543°F initiate ATT 3 minimum temperature for criticality.

If RCS temperature ≤535°F or ≥581°F Trip | Confirm | EOP-TRIP-1.

If load reduction required to maintain condenser backpressure limits, initiate a load reduction IAW AB.LOAD as required.

If load reduction > 15%/min required or ATT 4 backpressure limit is exceeded and power is ≥P-9, Trip | Confirm | EOP-TRIP-1.  If <P-9 trip the turbine and initiate AB-TRB-0001 (could result in turbine blade fatigue damage).

If flashing is indicated in the hotwell or condensate pump suction (oscillating amps, erratic SGFP suction) initiate a load reduction at ≤5%/min (prevent steam dump operation) until flashing stops.

If reactor power is <5% and backpressure has not stabilized, close the MS167s (prevent overpressurizing the condenser).

Subsequent Actions:

Check for vacuum leaks IAW ATT 2

If a vacuum pump malfunctioned close the AR25 and stop the affected pump

If rising backpressure is due to a circulator malfunction go to AB-CW-0001

Start all available vacuum pumps

If vacuum is stable or rising exit this procedure

If vacuum continues to lower and the turbine is latched, initiate a load reduction at ≤5%/min (prevents steam dump operation) until backpressure stabilizes. steam dump permissive lost at 10” Hga

Bypass condensate polishers if suction temperature reaches 140°F (prevent resin damage and condensate pump suction flashing) (Open CN108s, close 2CN109)

If load is reduced to 50 MWe and backpressure cannot be stabilized, trip the turbine and initiate AB-TRB­0001

Continue until backpressure stabilizes

If turbine is not latched reduce power until backpressure stabilizes or 5% power reached.  At 5% reactor power place AF in service and use MS10s to control T_AVG.  Locate and isolate the source of leakage.

Stall – flow separation and reversal in slope of the lift curve caused by high backpressure and low mass flow rates and off design steam impingement angles on the last row of blades.

Flutter – non-synchronous blade vibration caused by high backpressure and low mass flow rates and off design steam impingement angles on the last row of blades.

Stall – flow separation and reversal in slope of the lift curve caused by high backpressure and low mass flow rates and off design steam impingement angles on the last row of blades.

Flutter – non-synchronous blade vibration caused by high backpressure and low mass flow rates and off design steam impingement angles on the last row of blades.

Bypass condensate polishers if suction temperature reaches 140°F (prevent resin damage and condensate pump suction flashing) (Open CN108s, close 2CN109)

27.5 Deg F DT

Stay within the NJPDES permit requirements

No Dead Fish.

To allow Rods to maintain Tave on program and to not allow Steam dumps to open and dump to the condensor.

If turbine is not latched reduce power until backpressure stabilizes or 5% power reached.  At 5% reactor power place AF in service and use MS10s to control T_AVG.  Locate and isolate the source of leakage.

1. Cond Back Pressure goes up
2. Hot Well goes down
3. Vacuum goes down
4. CW DT goes Up 

4 PSI Containment pressure

Containment rad monitors (R44) 1e5 cps

Used to adjust to loss of margin due to equipment affected by containment pressure rise.

Immediate impact: Level indication

Minimal impact on Temperature Inst.

Hi rad impact over time

1. SDM
2. Core Cooling
3. Heat Sink
4. Thermal Shock
5. Containment Evionment
6. Coolant Inventory 

Purple and red: Constant monitoring

Conditions not stable: constant Monitoring

Yellow and Green, Stable conditions, CRS concurrence: Monitor every 15min

AB-RC-0001                      Reactor Coolant System Leak

(Rev. 10)

Entry Conditions:

Any indication of an RCS leak (Procedure is written to address leaks within the capacity of a centrifugal charging pump with minimum letdown. Major steps are to stabilize RCS, identify and isolate leak, then act IAW T/Ss.)

Continuous Action Summary:

If RCS temperature is >350°F and PZR level can not be maintained >17% (cannot recover pressure because heaters are gone) or VCT level >4% (Leak exceeds makeup capacity ~ 70 gpm),
Trip | Confirm | SI | EOP-TRIP-1.

If leak is into a SG initiate AB-SG-0001

If leak is from a PORV or Code Safety initiate AB-PZR-0001

If leak is suspected in containment (temperature/pressure rising) place 2 CFCUs in slow and 2 in fast (Prevent SI, minimize offsite release, 2S/2F is the optimum configuration to maintain ring duct pressure and support slow speed fans)

If in mode 5 or 6, initiate containment closure IAW AB-CONT-0001(4 hours to establish unless reduced inventory, then 1 hour to establish closure)

If RCS temperature is <200°F and PZR level can not be maintained >11% then concurrently locate leak IAW attachments 2, 3 and go to AB-RHR-0001.

Subsequent Actions:

Mode 1,2, or 3 with Accumulators unisolated

If PZR level is not stable or rising, shift to a centrifugal charging pump, stabilize PZR level and reduce letdown to minimum (Evaluate leakrate using charging vs. letdown).

If PZR level can not be maintained stable or rising, Trip | Confirm | SI | EOP-TRIP-1(a leak in excess of ~63 gpm [120 gpm – 45 gpm – 12 gpm]) Raise charging to 120 gpm—if PZR level is still lowering, give it up. The basis uses 150 gpm, but VCT makeup is the limiting factor.

If PZR is stable or rising initiate RCS inventory balance (Aids in ECG classification and future procedure decisions), locate the leak IAW attachments 2 & 3, maintain VCT level using makeup system.

Wait until leak is identified and reduced below Tech Spec limits, Continued Operation with leakage in excess of 0.7 gal/min and below tech spec limits has been evaluated, or SM/CRS directs a reactor shutdown (TS 3.4.7.2 requires shutdown if not isolated in 4 hours).

Maintain RCS pressure as low as possible and consider depressurizing when below 200°F (No boiling would be expected to occur and leakrate would be minimized).

Mode 3 with Accumulators Isolated, or Mode 4

Go to AB-LOCA-0001(Addresses situations where some ECCS components may be unavailable)

Mode 5 or 6

If PZR level is lowering, start a centrifugal charging pump or a safety injection pump, maintain PZR level 11-50%

Initiate RCS inventory balance and locate leak IAW attachment 2

Leakrate Calculations

If PZR level is stable or rising:  F_CHG – F_LD – F_SEALS = leakrate

If PZR is lowering:  [(P_Lf – P_L0)(75) + (V_Lf – V_L0)(20) – (T_f - T₀)(75) – VCT makeup] where P is PZR level, V is VCT level and T is T_AVG.  An active RCS leak will yield a negative value.

Leakage Detection:TS 3.4.7.1 requires 2 of the following 3 detection systems

Containment Particulate (R11A)

Containment Sump Pump start frequency

Containment Gaseous (R12A) or CFCU Condensate Collection

Of these detection systems R11A is the quickest to respond to an RCS leak.  An alarm can be actuated in as little as 30 minutes for a 0.1 gpm leak.  The second most sensitive indication will likely be containment parameters such as temperature, dewpoint, and pressure.  The next most probable indicators are charging flow, letdown flow, VCT level, and PZR level

RCS Leakage Limits: TS 3.4.7.2 limits leakage to the following:

No PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE (mode 3 in 6 hours, mode 5 in next 30 hours)

150 gpd 1° è 2° through any 1 SG (Mode 3 in 6 hours and mode 5 in next 30)  Salem admin limit is 140 gpd (0.1 gpm)

1 gpm UNIDENTIFIED Leakage (reduce within 4 hours or be in mode 3 in 6 hours and mode 5 in next 30)

10 gpm IDENTIFIED Leakage (reduce within 4 hours or be in mode 3 in 6 hours and mode 5 in next 30)

1 gpm leakage at 2230 ±20 psig from any Specified RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (isolate within 4 hours or be in mode 3 in 6 hours and mode 5 in next 30)

Intersystem LOCA Outside Containment

Break occurs in a system connected to RCS. Lower pressure system exposed to high RCS pressures beyond its capacity.

Break flows outside containment è high offsite radiological consequences; inventory lost from ECCS long term recirc.

Event Classification Guide

10 gpm pressure boundary leakage – declare an unusual event

10 gpm unidentified leakage – declare an unusual event

25 gpm identified leakage – declare an unusual event

Additional Notes:

When shifting CFCUs for a leak inside containment, it is important for the operator to pay attention to SW pressure. Rule of thumb: 1000 GPM demand on SW will yield a 4-5# reduction in SW pressure.

Charging thru the BIT flowpath not used; procedure provides greater control via CV55—important for small breaks.

AB-STM-1

Cook Notes

AB-STM-0001         Excessive Steam Flow

(Rev. 9)

Entry Conditions:

An unexpected rise in steam flow resulting in a reactor / turbine power mismatch

Any known or suspected steam leak

Continuous Action Summary:

If at any time reactor power rises uncontrollably, cooldown rate exceeds 50°F/hour, or a MSLI is needed, TRIP the reactor, CONFIRM the trip, initiate MSLI (if the source is not isolated initiate SI) and go to EOP-TRIP-1 (addresses conditions where personnel safety is jeopardized or reactor safety can not be assured)

If RCS temperature is ≤535°F or ≥581°F, Trip | Confirm | EOP-TRIP-1

If RCS temperature is <541°F refer to TS 3.1.1.4 for required action (this is different than AB.LOAD)

If the following can not be maintained during the shutdown, TRIP the reactor, CONFIRM the trip, initiate MSLI (if the source is not isolated, then initiate SI) and go to EOP-TRIP-1

C/D ≤50°F/hour

RCS temperature control

PZR level/pressure control

Containment pressure control

Subsequent Actions:

If the turbine is latched and EH is malfunctioning and power is <P-9, trip the turbine, initiate AB.TRB-0001 and continue with leak identification steps. >P-9, Trip | Confirm | EOP-TRIP-1

If EH is functioning properly, reduce load as necessary to ≤100% on PRNIs (prevent challenging RPS PR HIΦ and OP∆T)

If any MS10 is malfunctioning, place in manual and shut, or shut its MS9

If any steam dump is malfunctioning, depress train A & B ‘off and reset bypass T_AVG pushbuttons and manually isolate the affected dump valve

If a safety valve is leaking, reduce power as necessary while maintaining <100 psid between SGs, direct maintenance to gag the malfunctioning safety.  If the safety can not be closed initiate a shutdown IAW IOP-4 (lowering power and T_AVG has proven effective in reseating safeties without undue risk to personnel)

If the steam leak is in containment operate all available CFCUs in slow (FSAR analyzed condition, minimizes containment pressure rise and SI actuation)

If the leak is outside of containment, send operators to locate and isolate the leak.  If the leak is not isolable, reduce power to as low as possible and trip the turbine, establish auxiliary feedwater to SGs, reduce power to <5% (minimize the affects of SG shrink and within the capacity of AF pumps since SGFPs are lost on MS167 closure), and close the MSIVs (shutting MSIVs with an upstream leak may result in SI due to ∆P)

AB-SG-1

Cook Notes

AB-SG-0001            Steam Generator Tube Leak

(Rev. 27)

Entry Conditions:

Chemistry department sample results

R40 rising activity, warning, or alarm (polisher)

R15 rising activity, warning, or alarm (air removal)

R19 rising activity, warning, or alarm (blowdown) not accurate following trip – don’t use as sole basis for entry

R53 rising activity, warning, or alarm (N¹⁶ detector, ≥25%)(used to verify R19 trends)

R46 rising activity, warning, or alarm (Main Steam Line High Rad)

Continuous Action Summary:

SG level rises uncontrollably – Trip | Confirm | SI | EOP-TRIP-1

If RCS >350°F and PZR level can not be maintained >17% or VCT level >4% (avoids swapover and the use of ESF equipment), Trip | Confirm | SI | EOP-TRIP-1.  (Leak exceeds VCT m/u of ~70 gpm)

If R15, R19, or R53 indicates rising trend, notify RadPro to initiate primary to secondary leak response procedure.

If any R53 goes into alarm, then initiate Attachment 2

Action Levels

                    I.    LR is ≥30 gpd but <75 gpd – shutdown not req’d – sample and trend

                   II.    LR is ≥75 gpd sustained for ≥1 hr, but at a rate of ≤30 gpd per hr – Mode 3 in ≤24 hrs

                  III.    LR is ≥75 gpd and at a rate of ≥30 gpd per hr – reduce Pwr to ≤50% in 1 hr & Mode 3 in next 2 hrs.
LR is ≥140 gpd – Mode 3 in ≤6 hrs

If R40 alarms ‘high’, evacuate Condensate Polisher Building until RADPRO posts area.

IF SG pressure reaches 1035 to 1040 psig, AND secondary systems are available, THEN OPERATE affected MS-18, as necessary, until affected SG pressure is ≤1000 psig.

Subsequent Actions: (shutdown – isolate affected SG – cooldown – depressurize)

De-energize TGA and CP sumps

If PZR level is lowering, shift to a centrifugal charging pump and minimum letdown.  If level continues to drop - Trip | Confirm | SI | EOP-TRIP-1.

If in Mode 4, initiate a shutdown to Mode 5.

If in Mode 1, 2, or 3 and PZR level is stable, identify the affected SG (prevents removal of unaffected heat sinks).

Maintain Pressurizer Level >35% to ≤70%.  ensures letdown doesn’t isolate during a trip and to maintain adequate level during the RCS cooldown to 503˚F CET Temperature

Reduce flow from affected SG:

If on Steam Dumps or RHR – set unaffected MS10s to 1015 psig

If on MS10s – set unaffected MS10s to current SG pressure

Set affected MS10 to 1045 psig(ensures unaffected SGs are used for heat removal and minimize contamination via the hotwells).

Shut affected GB4, MS7 and MS18 and MS45 (23 AFW Pump inoperable, T/S 3.7.1.2).  Align BD sampling to waste and isolate affected MS sample point. (Open 1WD900 and close 901)

Notify Chemistry to sample (at least once per hour) and determine leak rate until stable (≤10% rise in an hour), and Rad Pro to perform surveys.

Initiate an RCS water inventory balance and either isolate GBD or align to condenser.

Small leak w/ rising trend of ≥30 gpd/hr è shutdown to Mode 3

At 20% Rx power, Trip the Turbine then Trip the R_X, complete actions through EOP-TRIP-2, then return to this AB (unless EOP-STGR is warranted)
Rapid borate for 35 min for each stuck rod coming back to this procedure from EOP-TRIP-2.

Depressurize RCS to 1900 psig¹ and Block Low Pressure SI possible reduction of SDM due to dilution from SG water

Isolate affected S/G

Maintain affected SG level >9% NR until in Mode 5 keep tubes covered

Cooldown RCS to 503°F as indicated by the Hottest CET, at 25° to 50°F/hr using intact Steam Generators adequate SDM only to 500°F

DEPRESSURIZE the RCS concurrently with cooldown AND MAINTAIN 20 to 40°F subcooling

WHEN the Hottest CET is at 503°F, DEPRESSURIZE RCS to the affected Steam Generator pressure

Attachment 6 – Special Considerations

Maintain affected loop RCP in operation until <200°F (aids in cooldown of S/G)

Depressurizing RCS to ≤ affected S/G pressure may result in SDM lowering due to backfill (dilution)

Cooldown and depressurize following shutdown can be completed by any of following methods:

Backfill

Drain & refill

Steaming S/G to condenser

Steam via MS10 (least desirable due to unmonitored release to environment)

When affected Steam Generator level reaches 62% NR, AFW should be secured and Steam Generator level should be allowed to drain to 9% NR before AFW is re-established.

Notes:

Small leaks – Na²⁴ and/or I¹³³

Large leaks – I¹³⁴

2R53 warning setpoint of ~23 cpm is equivalent to a 5 gpd leak at the bottom, tube sheet area, of the steam generator at 100% power

¹The preferred order for depressurizing the RCS is using the master controller, manual operation of either PS1 or PS3, aux spray, then PR1 or PR2.

End up:

GO TO IOP-6, Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown, AND INITIATE the following procedures as required:

S2.OP-SO.CN-0004(Z)          Condensate System Cleanup

S2.OP-SO.GBD-0001(Q)       Draining the Steam Generator

SC.RE-ST.ZZ-0002(Q)           Shutdown Margin Calculation, prior to cooldown below 500°F Tave